Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Contributions to Philosophy', 'Treatise of Human Nature, Appendix' and 'Russell's Metaphysical Logic'

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23 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 8. Impredicative Definition
21704 'Impredictative' definitions fix a class in terms of the greater class to which it belongs [Linsky,B]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / p. Axiom of Reducibility
21705 Reducibility says any impredicative function has an appropriate predicative replacement [Linsky,B]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
21727 Definite descriptions theory eliminates the King of France, but not the Queen of England [Linsky,B]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 5. Extensionalism
21719 Extensionalism means what is true of a function is true of coextensive functions [Linsky,B]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
21723 The task of logicism was to define by logic the concepts 'number', 'successor' and '0' [Linsky,B]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / b. Type theory
21721 Higher types are needed to distinguished intensional phenomena which are coextensive [Linsky,B]
21703 Types are 'ramified' when there are further differences between the type of quantifier and its range [Linsky,B]
21714 The ramified theory subdivides each type, according to the range of the variables [Linsky,B]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
21713 Did logicism fail, when Russell added three nonlogical axioms, to save mathematics? [Linsky,B]
21715 For those who abandon logicism, standard set theory is a rival option [Linsky,B]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
21729 Construct properties as sets of objects, or say an object must be in the set to have the property [Linsky,B]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
20189 Belief is a feeling, independent of the will, which arises from uncontrolled and unknown causes [Hume]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
21309 A proposition cannot be intelligible or consistent, if the perceptions are not so [Hume]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 7. Seeing Resemblance
15755 Hume needs a notion which includes degrees of resemblance [Shoemaker on Hume]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 5. Self as Associations
5323 Experiences are logically separate, but factually linked by simultaneity or a feeling of continuousness [Ayer on Hume]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
21311 Are self and substance the same? Then how can self remain if substance changes? [Hume]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / c. Inadequacy of mental continuity
21312 Perceptions are distinct, so no connection between them can ever be discovered [Hume]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
21308 We have no impression of the self, and we therefore have no idea of it [Hume]
21310 Does an oyster with one perception have a self? Would lots of perceptions change that? [Hume]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
23115 We have no natural love of mankind, other than through various relationships [Hume]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
20767 Culture is now dominated by boredom, so universal it is unnoticed [Heidegger, by Aho]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
16946 Causation is just invariance, as long as it is described in general terms [Quine on Hume]
15250 If impressions, memories and ideas only differ in vivacity, nothing says it is memory, or repetition [Whitehead on Hume]