32 ideas
15585 | Later Heidegger sees philosophy as more like poetry than like science [Heidegger, by Polt] |
22285 | Impredicative definitions are circular, but fine for picking out, rather than creating something [Potter] |
22301 | The Identity Theory says a proposition is true if it coincides with what makes it true [Potter] |
22324 | It has been unfortunate that externalism about truth is equated with correspondence [Potter] |
22279 | Frege's sign |--- meant judgements, but the modern |- turnstile means inference, with intecedents [Potter] |
22291 | Deductivism can't explain how the world supports unconditional conclusions [Potter] |
22295 | Modern logical truths are true under all interpretations of the non-logical words [Potter] |
22310 | The formalist defence against Gödel is to reject his metalinguistic concept of truth [Potter] |
22298 | Why is fictional arithmetic applicable to the real world? [Potter] |
22287 | If 'concrete' is the negative of 'abstract', that means desires and hallucinations are concrete [Potter] |
22284 | 'Greater than', which is the ancestral of 'successor', strictly orders the natural numbers [Potter] |
4444 | One moderate nominalist view says that properties and relations exist, but they are particulars [Armstrong] |
4445 | If properties and relations are particulars, there is still the problem of how to classify and group them [Armstrong] |
4448 | Should we decide which universals exist a priori (through words), or a posteriori (through science)? [Armstrong] |
4446 | It is claimed that some universals are not exemplified by any particular, so must exist separately [Armstrong] |
4440 | 'Resemblance Nominalism' finds that in practice the construction of resemblance classes is hard [Armstrong] |
4439 | 'Resemblance Nominalism' says properties are resemblances between classes of particulars [Armstrong] |
4431 | 'Predicate Nominalism' says that a 'universal' property is just a predicate applied to lots of things [Armstrong] |
4433 | Concept and predicate nominalism miss out some predicates, and may be viciously regressive [Armstrong] |
4432 | 'Concept Nominalism' says a 'universal' property is just a mental concept applied to lots of things [Armstrong] |
4434 | 'Class Nominalism' says that properties or kinds are merely membership of a set (e.g. of white things) [Armstrong] |
4435 | 'Class Nominalism' cannot explain co-extensive properties, or sets with random members [Armstrong] |
4436 | 'Class Nominalism' may explain properties if we stick to 'natural' sets, and ignore random ones [Armstrong] |
4437 | 'Mereological Nominalism' sees whiteness as a huge white object consisting of all the white things [Armstrong] |
4438 | 'Mereological Nominalism' may work for whiteness, but it doesn't seem to work for squareness [Armstrong] |
22281 | A material conditional cannot capture counterfactual reasoning [Potter] |
22327 | Knowledge from a drunken schoolteacher is from a reliable and unreliable process [Potter] |
22273 | Traditionally there are twelve categories of judgement, in groups of three [Potter] |
22290 | The phrase 'the concept "horse"' can't refer to a concept, because it is saturated [Potter] |
22283 | Compositionality should rely on the parsing tree, which may contain more than sentence components [Potter] |
22282 | 'Direct compositonality' says the components wholly explain a sentence meaning [Potter] |
22296 | Compositionality is more welcome in logic than in linguistics (which is more contextual) [Potter] |