77 ideas
22223 | Being-in-the-world is projection to possibilities, thrownness among them, and fallenness within them [Heidegger, by Caputo] |
22158 | Pheomenology seeks things themselves, without empty theories, problems and concepts [Heidegger] |
15574 | 'Logos' really means 'making something manifest' [Heidegger, by Polt] |
15569 | Heidegger says truth is historical, and never absolute [Heidegger, by Polt] |
21897 | Reducing being to the study of beings too readily accepts the modern scientific view [Heidegger, by May] |
15573 | For us, Being is constituted by awareness of other sorts of Being [Heidegger] |
9273 | Heidegger turns to 'Being' to affirm the uniqueness of humans in the world [Heidegger, by Gray] |
22157 | Dasein is a mode of Being distinguished by concern for its own Being [Heidegger] |
8137 | Dasein is ahead of itself in the world, and alongside encountered entities [Heidegger] |
21951 | In company with others one's Dasein dissolves, and even the others themselves dissolve [Heidegger] |
20745 | 'Dasein' expresses not 'what' the entity is, but its being [Heidegger] |
8134 | The word 'dasein' is used to mean 'the manner of Being which man possesses', and also the human creature [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE] |
8135 | 'Dasein' is Being which is laid claim to, and which matters to its owner [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE] |
21948 | Dasein is being which can understand itself, and possess itself in a way allowing authenticity [Heidegger] |
7680 | Ontology is possible only as phenomenology [Heidegger] |
22161 | Readiness-to-hand defines things in themselves ontologically [Heidegger] |
15576 | Heidegger seeks a non-traditional concept of essence as 'essential unfolding' [Heidegger, by Polt] |
15578 | Propositions don't provide understanding, because the understanding must come first [Heidegger, by Polt] |
22159 | If we posit 'I' as the starting point, we miss the mind's phenomenal content [Heidegger] |
22160 | Our relationship to a hammer strengthens when we use [Heidegger] |
15580 | There are no raw sense-data - our experiences are of the sound or colour of something [Heidegger] |
20749 | Perceived objects always appear in a context [Heidegger] |
7871 | Perceptual concepts can't just refer to what causes classification [Papineau] |
22163 | The scandal of philosophy is expecting to prove reality when the prover's Being is vague [Heidegger] |
21949 | Having thoughts and feelings need engagement in the world [Heidegger, by Wrathall] |
7852 | The only serious mind-brain theories now are identity, token identity, realization and supervenience [Papineau] |
7864 | Maybe mind and body do overdetermine acts, but are linked (for some reason) [Papineau] |
22222 | Dasein finds itself already amongst others [Heidegger, by Caputo] |
8136 | If we work and play with other people, they are bound to be 'Dasein', intelligent agents [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE] |
7873 | Young children can see that other individuals sometimes have false beliefs [Papineau] |
7874 | Do we understand other minds by simulation-theory, or by theory-theory? [Papineau] |
22164 | When Dasein grasps something it exists externally alongside the thing [Heidegger] |
7882 | Researching phenomenal consciousness is peculiar, because the concepts involved are peculiar [Papineau] |
7854 | Whether octopuses feel pain is unclear, because our phenomenal concepts are too vague [Papineau] |
7889 | Our concept of consciousness is crude, and lacks theoretical articulation [Papineau] |
7891 | We can’t decide what 'conscious' means, so it is undecidable whether cats are conscious [Papineau] |
7890 | Maybe a creature is conscious if its mental states represent things in a distinct way [Papineau] |
7885 | The 'actualist' HOT theory says consciousness comes from actual higher judgements of mental states [Papineau] |
7886 | Actualist HOT theories imply that a non-conscious mental event could become conscious when remembered [Papineau] |
7887 | States are conscious if they could be the subject of higher-order mental judgements [Papineau] |
7888 | Higher-order judgements may be possible where the subject denies having been conscious [Papineau] |
22162 | There is an everyday self, and an authentic self, when it is grasped in its own way [Heidegger] |
20114 | Everyone is other, and no one is himself [Heidegger] |
7860 | The epiphenomenal relation of mind and brain is a 'causal dangler', unlike anything else [Papineau] |
7862 | Maybe minds do not cause actions, but do cause us to report our decisions [Papineau] |
7870 | Role concepts either name the realising property, or the higher property constituting the role [Papineau] |
7858 | If causes are basic particulars, this doesn't make conscious and physical properties identical [Papineau] |
7865 | Supervenience can be replaced by identifying mind with higher-order or disjunctional properties [Papineau] |
7892 | The completeness of physics is needed for mind-brain identity [Papineau] |
7879 | Mind-brain reduction is less explanatory, because phenomenal concepts lack causal roles [Papineau] |
20971 | Weak reduction of mind is to physical causes; strong reduction is also to physical laws [Papineau] |
7856 | It is absurd to think that physical effects are caused twice, so conscious causes must be physical [Papineau] |
7881 | Accept ontological monism, but conceptual dualism; we think in a different way about phenomenal thought [Papineau] |
7866 | Mary acquires new concepts; she previously thought about the same property using material concepts [Papineau] |
7850 | Thinking about a thing doesn't require activating it [Papineau] |
7851 | Consciousness affects bodily movement, so thoughts must be material states [Papineau] |
15577 | Moods are more fundamentally revealing than theories - as when fear reveals a threat [Heidegger, by Polt] |
7884 | Most reductive accounts of representation imply broad content [Papineau] |
7863 | If content hinges on matters outside of you, how can it causally influence your actions? [Papineau] |
7883 | Verificationists tend to infer indefinite answers from undecidable questions [Papineau] |
7872 | Teleosemantics equates meaning with the item the concept is intended to track [Papineau] |
7869 | Truth conditions in possible worlds can't handle statements about impossibilities [Papineau] |
7868 | Thought content is possible worlds that make the thought true; if that includes the actual world, it's true [Papineau] |
20748 | We do not add value to naked things; its involvement is disclosed in understanding it [Heidegger] |
7453 | Galen's medicine followed the mean; each illness was balanced by opposite treatment [Galen, by Hacking] |
22166 | Dasein has the potential to be itself, but must be shown this in the midst of ordinariness [Heidegger] |
22165 | Anxiety reveals the possibility and individuality of Dasein [Heidegger] |
21952 | Anxiety about death frees me to live my own life [Heidegger, by Wrathall] |
22224 | Anxiety is the uncanniness felt when constantly fleeing from asserting one's own freedom [Heidegger, by Caputo] |
15572 | Being what it is (essentia) must be conceived in terms of Being (existence) [Heidegger] |
20453 | Heidegger says we must either choose an inauthentic hero, or choose yourself as hero [Heidegger, by Critchley] |
7853 | Causation is based on either events, or facts, or states of affairs [Papineau] |
7857 | Causes are instantiations of properties by particulars, or they are themselves basic particulars [Papineau] |
20976 | The completeness of physics cannot be proved [Papineau] |
20974 | Modern biological research, especially into the cell, has revealed no special new natural forces [Papineau] |
20970 | Determinism is possible without a complete physics, if mental forces play a role [Papineau] |
20975 | Quantum 'wave collapses' seem to violate conservation of energy [Papineau] |