Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On the Essence of Truth', 'The Meaning of 'Meaning'' and 'Against Structural Universals'

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27 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
21953 For Heidegger there is 'ontic' truth or 'uncoveredness', as in "he is a true friend" [Heidegger, by Wrathall]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
15435 If you think universals are immanent, you must believe them to be sparse, and not every related predicate [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
15451 I assume there could be natural properties that are not instantiated in our world [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
15433 Tropes are particular properties, which cannot recur, but can be exact duplicates [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
15436 Universals are meant to give an account of resemblance [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
15438 We can add a primitive natural/unnatural distinction to class nominalism [Lewis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object
15448 The 'magical' view of structural universals says they are atoms, even though they have parts [Lewis]
15449 If 'methane' is an atomic structural universal, it has nothing to connect it to its carbon universals [Lewis]
15439 The 'pictorial' view of structural universals says they are wholes made of universals as parts [Lewis]
15441 The structural universal 'methane' needs the universal 'hydrogen' four times over [Lewis]
15445 Butane and Isobutane have the same atoms, but different structures [Lewis]
15434 Structural universals have a necessary connection to the universals forming its parts [Lewis]
15437 We can't get rid of structural universals if there are no simple universals [Lewis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
15446 Composition is not just making new things from old; there are too many counterexamples [Lewis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
15440 A whole is distinct from its parts, but is not a further addition in ontology [Lewis]
15444 Different things (a toy house and toy car) can be made of the same parts at different times [Lewis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
18890 Putnam smuggles essentialism about liquids into his proof that water must be H2O [Salmon,N on Putnam]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
7705 The Twin Earth theory suggests that intentionality is independent of qualia [Jacquette on Putnam]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
15450 Maybe abstraction is just mereological subtraction [Lewis]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
4099 If Twins talking about 'water' and 'XYZ' have different thoughts but identical heads, then thoughts aren't in the head [Putnam, by Crane]
12026 We say ice and steam are different forms of water, but not that they are different forms of H2O [Forbes,G on Putnam]
3208 Does 'water' mean a particular substance that was 'dubbed'? [Putnam, by Rey]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
15443 Mathematicians abstract by equivalence classes, but that doesn't turn a many into one [Lewis]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
3893 Often reference determines sense, and not (as Frege thought) vice versa [Putnam, by Scruton]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
11191 The hidden structure of a natural kind determines membership in all possible worlds [Putnam]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
11192 If causes are the essence of diseases, then disease is an example of a relational essence [Putnam, by Williams,NE]
11190 Archimedes meant by 'gold' the hidden structure or essence of the stuff [Putnam]