28 ideas
15586 | When philosophy makes itself intelligible, it commits suicide [Heidegger] |
2319 | Metaphysics is the clarification of the ontological relationships between different areas of thought [Kim] |
13407 | All worthwhile philosophy is synthetic theorizing, evaluated by experience [Papineau] |
2317 | Reductionism is good on light, genes, temperature and transparency [Kim, by PG] |
2310 | Supervenience is linked to dependence [Kim] |
2315 | Mereological supervenience says wholes are fixed by parts [Kim] |
2329 | Causal power is a good way of distinguishing the real from the unreal [Kim] |
13409 | Our best theories may commit us to mathematical abstracta, but that doesn't justify the commitment [Papineau] |
2320 | Properties can have causal powers lacked by their constituents [Kim] |
13406 | A priori knowledge is analytic - the structure of our concepts - and hence unimportant [Papineau] |
13408 | Intuition and thought-experiments embody substantial information about the world [Papineau] |
530 | There are two contradictory arguments about everything [Kim] |
13314 | Protagoras says arguments on both sides are always equal [Kim, by Seneca] |
2065 | Not every person is the measure of all things, but only wise people [Plato on Kim] |
1550 | Why didn't Protagoras begin by saying "a tadpole is the measure of all things"? [Plato on Kim] |
2318 | Agency, knowledge, reason, memory, psychology all need mental causes [Kim, by PG] |
2325 | It seems impossible that an exact physical copy of this world could lack intentionality [Kim] |
2324 | Intentionality as function seems possible [Kim] |
2314 | Maybe intentionality is reducible, but qualia aren't [Kim] |
2313 | Emergentism says there is no explanation for a supervenient property [Kim] |
2328 | The only mental property that might be emergent is that of qualia [Kim] |
2309 | Non-Reductive Physicalism relies on supervenience [Kim] |
2311 | Maybe strong supervenience implies reduction [Kim] |
2308 | Identity theory was overthrown by multiple realisations and causal anomalies [Kim] |
2322 | Multiple realisation applies to other species, and even one individual over time [Kim] |
2327 | Knowledge and inversion make functionalism about qualia doubtful [Kim] |
2323 | Emotions have both intentionality and qualia [Kim] |
13410 | Verificationism about concepts means you can't deny a theory, because you can't have the concept [Papineau] |