47 ideas
| 15582 | Perhaps the aim of philosophy is to abolish sham problems [Heidegger] |
| 11159 | My account shows how the concept works, rather than giving an analysis [Fine,K] |
| 11157 | Modern philosophy has largely abandoned real definitions, apart from sortals [Fine,K] |
| 11171 | Defining a term and giving the essence of an object don't just resemble - they are the same [Fine,K] |
| 11151 | An object is dependent if its essence prevents it from existing without some other object [Fine,K] |
| 11152 | Essences are either taken as real definitions, or as necessary properties [Fine,K] |
| 11161 | Essentially having a property is naturally expressed as 'the property it must have to be what it is' [Fine,K] |
| 11160 | Simple modal essentialism refers to necessary properties of an object [Fine,K] |
| 11158 | Essentialist claims can be formulated more clearly with quantified modal logic [Fine,K] |
| 11167 | Metaphysical necessity is a special case of essence, not vice versa [Fine,K] |
| 16537 | Essence as necessary properties produces a profusion of essential properties [Fine,K, by Lowe] |
| 11163 | The nature of singleton Socrates has him as a member, but not vice versa [Fine,K] |
| 11164 | It is not part of the essence of Socrates that a huge array of necessary truths should hold [Fine,K] |
| 10935 | An essential property of something must be bound up with what it is to be that thing [Fine,K, by Rami] |
| 10936 | Essential properties are part of an object's 'definition' [Fine,K, by Rami] |
| 11165 | If Socrates lacks necessary existence, then his nature cannot require his parents' existence [Fine,K] |
| 11166 | The subject of a proposition need not be the source of its necessity [Fine,K] |
| 11169 | Conceptual necessities rest on the nature of all concepts [Fine,K] |
| 11162 | Socrates is necessarily distinct from the Eiffel Tower, but that is not part of his essence [Fine,K] |
| 11168 | Metaphysical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all objects [Fine,K] |
| 15579 | My active existence is defined by being able to say 'I can' [Heidegger] |
| 15583 | Certainty that I will die is more basic to my existence than the Cogito [Heidegger] |
| 11170 | Analytic truth may only be true in virtue of the meanings of certain terms [Fine,K] |
| 11172 | The meaning of 'bachelor' is irrelevant to the meaning of 'unmarried man' [Fine,K] |
| 23616 | Legal excuses are duress, ignorance, and diminished responsibility [McMahan] |
| 23606 | Liberty Rights are permissions, and Claim Rights are freedom from intervention [McMahan] |
| 23620 | A person or state may be attacked if they are responsible for an unjustified threat [McMahan] |
| 23598 | You (e.g. a police officer) are not liable to attack just because you pose a threat [McMahan] |
| 23594 | Wars can be unjust, despite a just cause, if they are unnecessary or excessive or of mixed cause [McMahan] |
| 23597 | Just war theory says all and only persons posing a threat are liable to attack [McMahan] |
| 23595 | The worst unjustified wars have no aim at all [McMahan] |
| 23619 | A defensive war is unjust, if it is responding to a just war [McMahan] |
| 23600 | Proportionality in fighting can't be judged independently of the justice of each side [McMahan] |
| 23603 | Can an army start an unjust war, and then fight justly to defend their own civilians? [McMahan] |
| 23611 | Soldiers cannot freely fight in unjust wars, just because they behave well when fighting [McMahan] |
| 23612 | The law of war differs from criminal law; attacking just combatants is immoral, but legal [McMahan] |
| 23617 | If the unjust combatants are morally excused they are innocent, so how can they be killed? [McMahan] |
| 23599 | You don't become a legitimate target, just because you violently resist an unjust attack [McMahan] |
| 23596 | If all combatants are seen as morally equal, that facilitates starting unjust wars [McMahan] |
| 23604 | Volunteer soldiers accept the risk of attack, but they don't agree to it, or to their deaths [McMahan] |
| 23608 | If being part of a big collective relieves soldiers of moral responsibility, why not the leaders too? [McMahan] |
| 23610 | If soldiers can't refuse to fight in unjust wars, can they choose to fight in just wars? [McMahan] |
| 23613 | Equality is both sides have permission, or both sides are justified, or one justified the other permitted [McMahan] |
| 23615 | Fighting unjustly under duress does not justify it, or permit it, but it may excuse it [McMahan] |
| 23605 | Soldiers cannot know enough facts to evaluate the justice of their war [McMahan] |
| 23602 | Innocence implies not being morally responsible, rather than merely being guiltless [McMahan] |
| 23618 | Unconditional surrender can't be demanded, since evil losers still have legitimate conditions [McMahan] |