99 ideas
| 14912 | There is no test for metaphysics, except devising alternative theories [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14904 | Metaphysics builds consilience networks across science [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14907 | Progress in metaphysics must be tied to progress in science [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14908 | Metaphysics must involve at least two scientific hypotheses, one fundamental, and add to explanation [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14910 | Some science is so general that it is metaphysical [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14940 | Cutting-edge physics has little to offer metaphysics [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14945 | The aim of metaphysics is to unite the special sciences with physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14898 | Modern metaphysics pursues aesthetic criteria like story-writing, and abandons scientific truth [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14899 | Why think that conceptual analysis reveals reality, rather than just how people think? [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14897 | We should abandon intuitions, especially that the world is made of little things, and made of something [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14936 | A metaphysics based on quantum gravity could result in almost anything [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14905 | The supremacy of science rests on its iterated error filters [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 22223 | Being-in-the-world is projection to possibilities, thrownness among them, and fallenness within them [Heidegger, by Caputo] |
| 22158 | Pheomenology seeks things themselves, without empty theories, problems and concepts [Heidegger] |
| 15574 | 'Logos' really means 'making something manifest' [Heidegger, by Polt] |
| 15569 | Heidegger says truth is historical, and never absolute [Heidegger, by Polt] |
| 14943 | Maybe mathematical logic rests on information-processing [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 21897 | Reducing being to the study of beings too readily accepts the modern scientific view [Heidegger, by May] |
| 15573 | For us, Being is constituted by awareness of other sorts of Being [Heidegger] |
| 9273 | Heidegger turns to 'Being' to affirm the uniqueness of humans in the world [Heidegger, by Gray] |
| 22157 | Dasein is a mode of Being distinguished by concern for its own Being [Heidegger] |
| 8137 | Dasein is ahead of itself in the world, and alongside encountered entities [Heidegger] |
| 21951 | In company with others one's Dasein dissolves, and even the others themselves dissolve [Heidegger] |
| 20745 | 'Dasein' expresses not 'what' the entity is, but its being [Heidegger] |
| 8134 | The word 'dasein' is used to mean 'the manner of Being which man possesses', and also the human creature [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE] |
| 8135 | 'Dasein' is Being which is laid claim to, and which matters to its owner [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE] |
| 21948 | Dasein is being which can understand itself, and possess itself in a way allowing authenticity [Heidegger] |
| 7680 | Ontology is possible only as phenomenology [Heidegger] |
| 14942 | Only admit into ontology what is explanatory and predictive [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14948 | To be is to be a real pattern [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14947 | Any process can be described as transfer of measurable information [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14941 | We say there is no fundamental level to ontology, and reality is just patterns [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 10493 | If concrete is spatio-temporal and causal, and abstract isn't, the distinction doesn't suit physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14934 | Concrete and abstract are too crude for modern physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 22161 | Readiness-to-hand defines things in themselves ontologically [Heidegger] |
| 14909 | Physicalism is 'part-whole' (all parts are physical), or 'supervenience/levels' (dependence on physical) [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14926 | Relations without relata must be treated as universals, with their own formal properties [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14929 | A belief in relations must be a belief in things that are related [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14925 | The normal assumption is that relations depend on properties of the relata [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14931 | That there are existent structures not made of entities is no stranger than the theory of universals [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14932 | Causal essentialism says properties are nothing but causal relations [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14920 | If science captures the modal structure of things, that explains why its predictions work [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14952 | Things are constructs for tracking patterns (and not linguistic, because animals do it) [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14950 | Maybe individuation can be explained by thermodynamic depth [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14946 | There are no cats in quantum theory, and no mountains in astrophysics [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14927 | Physics seems to imply that we must give up self-subsistent individuals [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14944 | There is no single view of individuals, because different sciences operate on different scales [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14928 | Things are abstractions from structures [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14892 | The idea of composition, that parts of the world are 'made of' something, is no longer helpful [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14949 | A sum of things is not a whole if the whole does not support some new generalisation [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 15576 | Heidegger seeks a non-traditional concept of essence as 'essential unfolding' [Heidegger, by Polt] |
| 14951 | We treat the core of a pattern as an essence, in order to keep track of it [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14958 | A continuous object might be a type, with instances at each time [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14903 | Quantum mechanics seems to imply single-case probabilities [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14923 | In quantum statistics, two separate classical states of affairs are treated as one [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 15578 | Propositions don't provide understanding, because the understanding must come first [Heidegger, by Polt] |
| 22159 | If we posit 'I' as the starting point, we miss the mind's phenomenal content [Heidegger] |
| 22160 | Our relationship to a hammer strengthens when we use [Heidegger] |
| 15580 | There are no raw sense-data - our experiences are of the sound or colour of something [Heidegger] |
| 20749 | Perceived objects always appear in a context [Heidegger] |
| 14955 | Rats find some obvious associations easier to learn than less obvious ones [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14918 | The doctrine of empiricism does not itself seem to be empirically justified [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14891 | There is no reason to think our intuitions are good for science or metaphysics [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 22163 | The scandal of philosophy is expecting to prove reality when the prover's Being is vague [Heidegger] |
| 14916 | What matters is whether a theory can predict - not whether it actually does so [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14915 | The theory of evolution was accepted because it explained, not because of its predictions [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14921 | The Ramsey-sentence approach preserves observations, but eliminates unobservables [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14922 | The Ramsey sentence describes theoretical entities; it skips reference, but doesn't eliminate it [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14953 | Induction is reasoning from the observed to the unobserved [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14914 | Inductive defences of induction may be rule-circular, but not viciously premise-circular [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14913 | We explain by deriving the properties of a phenomenon by embedding it in a large abstract theory [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 21949 | Having thoughts and feelings need engagement in the world [Heidegger, by Wrathall] |
| 22222 | Dasein finds itself already amongst others [Heidegger, by Caputo] |
| 8136 | If we work and play with other people, they are bound to be 'Dasein', intelligent agents [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE] |
| 22164 | When Dasein grasps something it exists externally alongside the thing [Heidegger] |
| 14930 | Maybe the only way we can think about a domain is by dividing it up into objects [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 22162 | There is an everyday self, and an authentic self, when it is grasped in its own way [Heidegger] |
| 20114 | Everyone is other, and no one is himself [Heidegger] |
| 14939 | Two versions of quantum theory say that the world is deterministic [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14911 | Science is opposed to downward causation [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 15577 | Moods are more fundamentally revealing than theories - as when fear reveals a threat [Heidegger, by Polt] |
| 20748 | We do not add value to naked things; its involvement is disclosed in understanding it [Heidegger] |
| 22166 | Dasein has the potential to be itself, but must be shown this in the midst of ordinariness [Heidegger] |
| 22165 | Anxiety reveals the possibility and individuality of Dasein [Heidegger] |
| 21952 | Anxiety about death frees me to live my own life [Heidegger, by Wrathall] |
| 22224 | Anxiety is the uncanniness felt when constantly fleeing from asserting one's own freedom [Heidegger, by Caputo] |
| 15572 | Being what it is (essentia) must be conceived in terms of Being (existence) [Heidegger] |
| 20453 | Heidegger says we must either choose an inauthentic hero, or choose yourself as hero [Heidegger, by Critchley] |
| 20977 | Natural rights are nonsense, and unspecified natural rights is nonsense on stilts [Bentham] |
| 21003 | Only laws can produce real rights; rights from 'law of nature' are imaginary [Bentham] |
| 14956 | Explanation by kinds and by clusters of properties just express the stability of reality [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14957 | There is nothing more to a natural kind than a real pattern in nature [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14954 | Causation is found in the special sciences, but may have no role in fundamental physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14902 | Science may have uninstantiated laws, inferred from approaching some unrealised limit [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14937 | That the universe must be 'made of' something is just obsolete physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14900 | In physics, matter is an emergent phenomenon, not part of fundamental ontology [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14901 | Spacetime may well be emergent, rather than basic [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14924 | If spacetime is substantial, what is the substance? [Ladyman/Ross] |
| 14938 | A fixed foliation theory of quantum gravity could make presentism possible [Ladyman/Ross] |