87 ideas
20962 | Habermas seems to make philosophy more democratic [Habermas, by Bowie] |
15670 | The aim of 'post-metaphysical' philosophy is to interpret the sciences [Habermas, by Finlayson] |
22223 | Being-in-the-world is projection to possibilities, thrownness among them, and fallenness within them [Heidegger, by Caputo] |
22158 | Pheomenology seeks things themselves, without empty theories, problems and concepts [Heidegger] |
15665 | We can do social philosophy by studying coordinated action through language use [Habermas, by Finlayson] |
15574 | 'Logos' really means 'making something manifest' [Heidegger, by Polt] |
20573 | Rather than instrumental reason, Habermas emphasises its communicative role [Habermas, by Oksala] |
21616 | Truth and falsity apply to suppositions as well as to assertions [Williamson] |
21623 | True and false are not symmetrical; false is more complex, involving negation [Williamson] |
15569 | Heidegger says truth is historical, and never absolute [Heidegger, by Polt] |
21602 | Many-valued logics don't solve vagueness; its presence at the meta-level is ignored [Williamson] |
21611 | Formal semantics defines validity as truth preserved in every model [Williamson] |
21606 | 'Bivalence' is the meta-linguistic principle that 'A' in the object language is true or false [Williamson] |
21605 | Excluded Middle is 'A or not A' in the object language [Williamson] |
21612 | Or-elimination is 'Argument by Cases'; it shows how to derive C from 'A or B' [Williamson] |
21599 | A sorites stops when it collides with an opposite sorites [Williamson] |
21897 | Reducing being to the study of beings too readily accepts the modern scientific view [Heidegger, by May] |
15573 | For us, Being is constituted by awareness of other sorts of Being [Heidegger] |
9273 | Heidegger turns to 'Being' to affirm the uniqueness of humans in the world [Heidegger, by Gray] |
22157 | Dasein is a mode of Being distinguished by concern for its own Being [Heidegger] |
8137 | Dasein is ahead of itself in the world, and alongside encountered entities [Heidegger] |
21951 | In company with others one's Dasein dissolves, and even the others themselves dissolve [Heidegger] |
20745 | 'Dasein' expresses not 'what' the entity is, but its being [Heidegger] |
8134 | The word 'dasein' is used to mean 'the manner of Being which man possesses', and also the human creature [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE] |
8135 | 'Dasein' is Being which is laid claim to, and which matters to its owner [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE] |
21948 | Dasein is being which can understand itself, and possess itself in a way allowing authenticity [Heidegger] |
7680 | Ontology is possible only as phenomenology [Heidegger] |
22161 | Readiness-to-hand defines things in themselves ontologically [Heidegger] |
21589 | When bivalence is rejected because of vagueness, we lose classical logic [Williamson] |
21596 | Vagueness undermines the stable references needed by logic [Williamson] |
21601 | A vague term can refer to very precise elements [Williamson] |
21629 | Equally fuzzy objects can be identical, so fuzziness doesn't entail vagueness [Williamson] |
21591 | Vagueness is epistemic. Statements are true or false, but we often don't know which [Williamson] |
21619 | If a heap has a real boundary, omniscient speakers would agree where it is [Williamson] |
21620 | The epistemic view says that the essence of vagueness is ignorance [Williamson] |
21622 | If there is a true borderline of which we are ignorant, this drives a wedge between meaning and use [Williamson] |
9120 | Vagueness in a concept is its indiscriminability from other possible concepts [Williamson] |
21625 | The vagueness of 'heap' can remain even when the context is fixed [Williamson] |
21614 | The 'nihilist' view of vagueness says that 'heap' is not a legitimate concept [Williamson] |
21617 | We can say propositions are bivalent, but vague utterances don't express a proposition [Williamson] |
21618 | If the vague 'TW is thin' says nothing, what does 'TW is thin if his perfect twin is thin' say? [Williamson] |
21590 | Asking when someone is 'clearly' old is higher-order vagueness [Williamson] |
21592 | Supervaluation keeps classical logic, but changes the truth in classical semantics [Williamson] |
21603 | You can't give a precise description of a language which is intrinsically vague [Williamson] |
21604 | Supervaluation assigns truth when all the facts are respected [Williamson] |
21607 | Supervaluation has excluded middle but not bivalence; 'A or not-A' is true, even when A is undecided [Williamson] |
21608 | Truth-functionality for compound statements fails in supervaluation [Williamson] |
21609 | Supervaluationism defines 'supertruth', but neglects it when defining 'valid' [Williamson] |
21610 | Supervaluation adds a 'definitely' operator to classical logic [Williamson] |
21613 | Supervaluationism cannot eliminate higher-order vagueness [Williamson] |
21633 | Nominalists suspect that properties etc are our projections, and could have been different [Williamson] |
21630 | If fuzzy edges are fine, then why not fuzzy temporal, modal or mereological boundaries? [Williamson] |
15576 | Heidegger seeks a non-traditional concept of essence as 'essential unfolding' [Heidegger, by Polt] |
21632 | A river is not just event; it needs actual and counterfactual boundaries [Williamson] |
21621 | We can't infer metaphysical necessities to be a priori knowable - or indeed knowable in any way [Williamson] |
21627 | We have inexact knowledge when we include margins of error [Williamson] |
15578 | Propositions don't provide understanding, because the understanding must come first [Heidegger, by Polt] |
22159 | If we posit 'I' as the starting point, we miss the mind's phenomenal content [Heidegger] |
22160 | Our relationship to a hammer strengthens when we use [Heidegger] |
20961 | What is considered a priori changes as language changes [Habermas, by Bowie] |
15580 | There are no raw sense-data - our experiences are of the sound or colour of something [Heidegger] |
20749 | Perceived objects always appear in a context [Heidegger] |
21626 | Knowing you know (KK) is usually denied if the knowledge concept is missing, or not considered [Williamson] |
22163 | The scandal of philosophy is expecting to prove reality when the prover's Being is vague [Heidegger] |
21949 | Having thoughts and feelings need engagement in the world [Heidegger, by Wrathall] |
22222 | Dasein finds itself already amongst others [Heidegger, by Caputo] |
8136 | If we work and play with other people, they are bound to be 'Dasein', intelligent agents [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE] |
22164 | When Dasein grasps something it exists externally alongside the thing [Heidegger] |
22162 | There is an everyday self, and an authentic self, when it is grasped in its own way [Heidegger] |
20114 | Everyone is other, and no one is himself [Heidegger] |
21631 | To know, believe, hope or fear, one must grasp the thought, but not when you fail to do them [Williamson] |
15577 | Moods are more fundamentally revealing than theories - as when fear reveals a threat [Heidegger, by Polt] |
21600 | 'Blue' is not a family resemblance, because all the blues resemble in some respect [Williamson] |
15667 | To understand a statement is to know what would make it acceptable [Habermas] |
15668 | Meaning is not fixed by a relation to the external world, but a relation to other speakers [Habermas, by Finlayson] |
21615 | References to the 'greatest prime number' have no reference, but are meaningful [Williamson] |
18038 | The 't' and 'f' of formal semantics has no philosophical interest, and may not refer to true and false [Williamson] |
21624 | It is known that there is a cognitive loss in identifying propositions with possible worlds [Williamson] |
20748 | We do not add value to naked things; its involvement is disclosed in understanding it [Heidegger] |
22166 | Dasein has the potential to be itself, but must be shown this in the midst of ordinariness [Heidegger] |
22165 | Anxiety reveals the possibility and individuality of Dasein [Heidegger] |
21952 | Anxiety about death frees me to live my own life [Heidegger, by Wrathall] |
22224 | Anxiety is the uncanniness felt when constantly fleeing from asserting one's own freedom [Heidegger, by Caputo] |
15572 | Being what it is (essentia) must be conceived in terms of Being (existence) [Heidegger] |
20453 | Heidegger says we must either choose an inauthentic hero, or choose yourself as hero [Heidegger, by Critchley] |
15669 | People endorse equality, universality and inclusiveness, just by their communicative practices [Habermas, by Finlayson] |
23416 | Political involvement is needed, to challenge existing practices [Habermas, by Kymlicka] |