13 ideas
15585 | Later Heidegger sees philosophy as more like poetry than like science [Heidegger, by Polt] |
17311 | Real definitions don't just single out a thing; they must also explain its essence [Koslicki] |
13655 | The Löwenheim-Skolem theorems show that whether all sets are constructible is indeterminate [Putnam, by Shapiro] |
9915 | V = L just says all sets are constructible [Putnam] |
9913 | The Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem is close to an antinomy in philosophy of language [Putnam] |
17312 | It is more explanatory if you show how a number is constructed from basic entities and relations [Koslicki] |
9914 | It is unfashionable, but most mathematical intuitions come from nature [Putnam] |
17314 | The relata of grounding are propositions or facts, but for dependence it is objects and their features [Koslicki] |
17313 | Modern views want essences just to individuate things across worlds and times [Koslicki] |
17309 | For Fine, essences are propositions true because of identity, so they are just real definitions [Koslicki] |
17315 | We need a less propositional view of essence, and so must distinguish it clearly from real definitions [Koslicki] |
17317 | A good explanation captures the real-world dependence among the phenomena [Koslicki] |
17316 | We can abstract to a dependent entity by blocking out features of its bearer [Koslicki] |