15 ideas
15585 | Later Heidegger sees philosophy as more like poetry than like science [Heidegger, by Polt] |
10143 | 'Creative definitions' do not presuppose the existence of the objects defined [Fine,K] |
9143 | Implicit definitions must be satisfiable, creative definitions introduce things, contextual definitions build on things [Fine,K, by Cook/Ebert] |
15335 | Peirce's theory offers anti-realist verificationism, but surely how things are is independent of us? [Horsten on Peirce] |
14796 | Independent truth (if there is any) is the ultimate result of sufficient enquiry [Peirce] |
10145 | Abstracts cannot be identified with sets [Fine,K] |
10136 | Points in Euclidean space are abstract objects, but not introduced by abstraction [Fine,K] |
10144 | Postulationism says avoid abstract objects by giving procedures that produce truth [Fine,K] |
14795 | Pragmatism is a way of establishing meanings, not a theory of metaphysics or a set of truths [Peirce] |
9144 | Fine's 'procedural postulationism' uses creative definitions, but avoids abstract ontology [Fine,K, by Cook/Ebert] |
10141 | Many different kinds of mathematical objects can be regarded as forms of abstraction [Fine,K] |
10135 | We can abstract from concepts (e.g. to number) and from objects (e.g. to direction) [Fine,K] |
9142 | Fine considers abstraction as reconceptualization, to produce new senses by analysing given senses [Fine,K, by Cook/Ebert] |
10137 | Abstractionism can be regarded as an alternative to set theory [Fine,K] |
10138 | An object is the abstract of a concept with respect to a relation on concepts [Fine,K] |