27 ideas
15585 | Later Heidegger sees philosophy as more like poetry than like science [Heidegger, by Polt] |
15063 | Some sentences depend for their truth on worldly circumstances, and others do not [Fine,K] |
12797 | If plural variables have 'some values', then non-count variables have 'some value' [Laycock] |
12794 | Plurals are semantical but not ontological [Laycock] |
17694 | Some non-count nouns can be used for counting, as in 'several wines' or 'fewer cheeses' [Laycock] |
17695 | Some apparent non-count words can take plural forms, such as 'snows' or 'waters' [Laycock] |
15078 | There are levels of existence, as well as reality; objects exist at the lowest level in which they can function [Fine,K] |
12792 | The category of stuff does not suit reference [Laycock] |
12799 | Descriptions of stuff are neither singular aggregates nor plural collections [Laycock] |
12818 | We shouldn't think some water retains its identity when it is mixed with air [Laycock] |
15072 | Bottom level facts are subject to time and world, middle to world but not time, and top to neither [Fine,K] |
15071 | Tensed and tenseless sentences state two sorts of fact, which belong to two different 'realms' of reality [Fine,K] |
15075 | Modal features are not part of entities, because they are accounted for by the entity [Fine,K] |
12795 | Parts must be of the same very general type as the wholes [Laycock] |
15065 | What it is is fixed prior to existence or the object's worldly features [Fine,K] |
15076 | Essential features of an object have no relation to how things actually are [Fine,K] |
15073 | Self-identity should have two components, its existence, and its neutral identity with itself [Fine,K] |
15074 | We would understand identity between objects, even if their existence was impossible [Fine,K] |
15064 | Proper necessary truths hold whatever the circumstances; transcendent truths regardless of circumstances [Fine,K] |
15070 | It is the nature of Socrates to be a man, so necessarily he is a man [Fine,K] |
15069 | Possible worlds may be more limited, to how things might actually turn out [Fine,K] |
15068 | The actual world is a totality of facts, so we also think of possible worlds as totalities [Fine,K] |
17696 | 'Humility is a virtue' has an abstract noun, but 'water is a liquid' has a generic concrete noun [Laycock] |
12791 | It is said that proper reference is our intellectual link with the world [Laycock] |
15077 | It is said that in the A-theory, all existents and objects must be tensed, as well as the sentences [Fine,K] |
15067 | A-theorists tend to reject the tensed/tenseless distinction [Fine,K] |
15066 | B-theorists say tensed sentences have an unfilled argument-place for a time [Fine,K] |