Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Being and Time', 'First-Order Modal Logic' and 'Three-Dimensionalism v Four-Dimensionalism'

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85 ideas

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 2. Phenomenology
Being-in-the-world is projection to possibilities, thrownness among them, and fallenness within them [Heidegger, by Caputo]
Pheomenology seeks things themselves, without empty theories, problems and concepts [Heidegger]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
'Logos' really means 'making something manifest' [Heidegger, by Polt]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 9. Rejecting Truth
Heidegger says truth is historical, and never absolute [Heidegger, by Polt]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 3. Truth Tables
Each line of a truth table is a model [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 2. Tools of Modal Logic / a. Symbols of ML
Modal logic adds □ (necessarily) and ◊ (possibly) to classical logic [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
We let 'R' be the accessibility relation: xRy is read 'y is accessible from x' [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
The symbol ||- is the 'forcing' relation; 'Γ ||- P' means that P is true in world Γ [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
The prefix σ names a possible world, and σ.n names a world accessible from that one [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 2. Tools of Modal Logic / b. Terminology of ML
Modern modal logic introduces 'accessibility', saying xRy means 'y is accessible from x' [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
A 'model' is a frame plus specification of propositions true at worlds, written < G,R,||- > [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
A 'constant' domain is the same for all worlds; 'varying' domains can be entirely separate [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
A 'frame' is a set G of possible worlds, with an accessibility relation R, written < G,R > [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Accessibility relations can be 'reflexive' (self-referring), 'transitive' (carries over), or 'symmetric' (mutual) [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 2. Tools of Modal Logic / c. Derivation rules of ML
Conj: a) if σ X∧Y then σ X and σ Y b) if σ ¬(X∧Y) then σ ¬X or σ ¬Y [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Bicon: a)if σ(X↔Y) then σ(X→Y) and σ(Y→X) b) [not biconditional, one or other fails] [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Disj: a) if σ ¬(X∨Y) then σ ¬X and σ ¬Y b) if σ X∨Y then σ X or σ Y [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Universal: a) if σ ¬◊X then σ.m ¬X b) if σ □X then σ.m X [m exists] [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Existential: a) if σ ◊X then σ.n X b) if σ ¬□X then σ.n ¬X [n is new] [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Negation: if σ ¬¬X then σ X [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
If a proposition is possibly true in a world, it is true in some world accessible from that world [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
If a proposition is necessarily true in a world, it is true in all worlds accessible from that world [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Implic: a) if σ ¬(X→Y) then σ X and σ ¬Y b) if σ X→Y then σ ¬X or σ Y [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
T reflexive: a) if σ □X then σ X b) if σ ¬◊X then σ ¬X [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
4r rev-trans: a) if σ.n □X then σ □X b) if σ.n ¬◊X then σ ¬◊X [n occurs] [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
4 transitive: a) if σ □X then σ.n □X b) if σ ¬◊X then σ.n ¬◊X [n occurs] [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
B symmetric: a) if σ.n □X then σ X b) if σ.n ¬◊X then σ ¬X [n occurs] [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
D serial: a) if σ □X then σ ◊X b) if σ ¬◊X then σ ¬□X [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
S5: a) if n ◊X then kX b) if n ¬□X then k ¬X c) if n □X then k X d) if n ¬◊X then k ¬X [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / b. System K
The system K has no accessibility conditions [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / c. System D
□P → P is not valid in D (Deontic Logic), since an obligatory action may be not performed [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
The system D has the 'serial' conditon imposed on its accessibility relation [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / d. System T
The system T has the 'reflexive' conditon imposed on its accessibility relation [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / e. System K4
The system K4 has the 'transitive' condition on its accessibility relation [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / f. System B
The system B has the 'reflexive' and 'symmetric' conditions on its accessibility relation [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / g. System S4
The system S4 has the 'reflexive' and 'transitive' conditions on its accessibility relation [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
System S5 has the 'reflexive', 'symmetric' and 'transitive' conditions on its accessibility relation [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
Modality affects content, because P→◊P is valid, but ◊P→P isn't [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 5. Epistemic Logic
Read epistemic box as 'a knows/believes P' and diamond as 'for all a knows/believes, P' [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
In epistemic logic knowers are logically omniscient, so they know that they know [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 6. Temporal Logic
F: will sometime, P: was sometime, G: will always, H: was always [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
The Barcan corresponds to anti-monotonicity, and the Converse to monotonicity [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
The Barcan says nothing comes into existence; the Converse says nothing ceases; the pair imply stability [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 3. Property (λ-) Abstraction
'Predicate abstraction' abstracts predicates from formulae, giving scope for constants and functions [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
Reducing being to the study of beings too readily accepts the modern scientific view [Heidegger, by May]
For us, Being is constituted by awareness of other sorts of Being [Heidegger]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / h. Dasein (being human)
Heidegger turns to 'Being' to affirm the uniqueness of humans in the world [Heidegger, by Gray]
Dasein is a mode of Being distinguished by concern for its own Being [Heidegger]
Dasein is ahead of itself in the world, and alongside encountered entities [Heidegger]
In company with others one's Dasein dissolves, and even the others themselves dissolve [Heidegger]
'Dasein' expresses not 'what' the entity is, but its being [Heidegger]
The word 'dasein' is used to mean 'the manner of Being which man possesses', and also the human creature [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE]
'Dasein' is Being which is laid claim to, and which matters to its owner [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE]
Dasein is being which can understand itself, and possess itself in a way allowing authenticity [Heidegger]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Ontology is possible only as phenomenology [Heidegger]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Readiness-to-hand defines things in themselves ontologically [Heidegger]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / a. Scattered objects
If we accept scattered objects such as archipelagos, why not think of cars that way? [Hawthorne]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Heidegger seeks a non-traditional concept of essence as 'essential unfolding' [Heidegger, by Polt]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
Four-dimensionalists say instantaneous objects are more fundamental than long-lived ones [Hawthorne]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
The Indiscernibility of Identicals has been a big problem for modal logic [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
A modal can reverse meaning if the context is seen differently, so maybe context is all? [Hawthorne]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
□ must be sensitive as to whether it picks out an object by essential or by contingent properties [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Objects retain their possible properties across worlds, so a bundle theory of them seems best [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
Counterpart relations are neither symmetric nor transitive, so there is no logic of equality for them [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Propositions don't provide understanding, because the understanding must come first [Heidegger, by Polt]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. Cogito Critique
If we posit 'I' as the starting point, we miss the mind's phenomenal content [Heidegger]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
Our relationship to a hammer strengthens when we use [Heidegger]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
There are no raw sense-data - our experiences are of the sound or colour of something [Heidegger]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
Perceived objects always appear in a context [Heidegger]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
The scandal of philosophy is expecting to prove reality when the prover's Being is vague [Heidegger]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / b. Purpose of mind
Having thoughts and feelings need engagement in the world [Heidegger, by Wrathall]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
Dasein finds itself already amongst others [Heidegger, by Caputo]
If we work and play with other people, they are bound to be 'Dasein', intelligent agents [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 6. Anti-Individualism
When Dasein grasps something it exists externally alongside the thing [Heidegger]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
There is an everyday self, and an authentic self, when it is grasped in its own way [Heidegger]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
Everyone is other, and no one is himself [Heidegger]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / c. Role of emotions
Moods are more fundamentally revealing than theories - as when fear reveals a threat [Heidegger, by Polt]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
We do not add value to naked things; its involvement is disclosed in understanding it [Heidegger]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
Dasein has the potential to be itself, but must be shown this in the midst of ordinariness [Heidegger]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 3. Angst
Anxiety reveals the possibility and individuality of Dasein [Heidegger]
Anxiety about death frees me to live my own life [Heidegger, by Wrathall]
Anxiety is the uncanniness felt when constantly fleeing from asserting one's own freedom [Heidegger, by Caputo]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 5. Existence-Essence
Being what it is (essentia) must be conceived in terms of Being (existence) [Heidegger]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 6. Authentic Self
Heidegger says we must either choose an inauthentic hero, or choose yourself as hero [Heidegger, by Critchley]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 6. Space-Time
Modern metaphysicians tend to think space-time points are more fundamental than space-time regions [Hawthorne]