Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Being and Time', 'talk' and 'Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind'

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84 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 4. Early European Thought
Aristotle is a buffoon who has misled the Church [Luther, by MacIntyre]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 2. Phenomenology
Being-in-the-world is projection to possibilities, thrownness among them, and fallenness within them [Heidegger, by Caputo]
Pheomenology seeks things themselves, without empty theories, problems and concepts [Heidegger]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
'Logos' really means 'making something manifest' [Heidegger, by Polt]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 9. Rejecting Truth
Heidegger says truth is historical, and never absolute [Heidegger, by Polt]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
Syntactical methods of proof need only structure, where semantic methods (truth-tables) need truth [Lowe]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
Reducing being to the study of beings too readily accepts the modern scientific view [Heidegger, by May]
For us, Being is constituted by awareness of other sorts of Being [Heidegger]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / h. Dasein (being human)
Heidegger turns to 'Being' to affirm the uniqueness of humans in the world [Heidegger, by Gray]
Dasein is a mode of Being distinguished by concern for its own Being [Heidegger]
Dasein is ahead of itself in the world, and alongside encountered entities [Heidegger]
In company with others one's Dasein dissolves, and even the others themselves dissolve [Heidegger]
'Dasein' expresses not 'what' the entity is, but its being [Heidegger]
The word 'dasein' is used to mean 'the manner of Being which man possesses', and also the human creature [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE]
'Dasein' is Being which is laid claim to, and which matters to its owner [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE]
Dasein is being which can understand itself, and possess itself in a way allowing authenticity [Heidegger]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Ontology is possible only as phenomenology [Heidegger]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Readiness-to-hand defines things in themselves ontologically [Heidegger]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Heidegger seeks a non-traditional concept of essence as 'essential unfolding' [Heidegger, by Polt]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
A 'substance' is a thing that remains the same when its properties change [Lowe]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Propositions don't provide understanding, because the understanding must come first [Heidegger, by Polt]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
Causal theories of belief make all beliefs true, and can't explain belief about the future [Lowe]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. Cogito Critique
Perhaps 'I' no more refers than the 'it' in 'it is raining' [Lowe]
If we posit 'I' as the starting point, we miss the mind's phenomenal content [Heidegger]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
Our relationship to a hammer strengthens when we use [Heidegger]
'Ecological' approaches say we don't infer information, but pick it up directly from reality [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
One must be able to visually recognise a table, as well as knowing its form [Lowe]
Computationalists object that the 'ecological' approach can't tell us how we get the information [Lowe]
Comparing shapes is proportional in time to the angle of rotation [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
There are no raw sense-data - our experiences are of the sound or colour of something [Heidegger]
The 'disjunctive' theory of perception says true perceptions and hallucinations need have nothing in common [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
Perceived objects always appear in a context [Heidegger]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 7. Causal Perception
A causal theorist can be a direct realist, if all objects of perception are external [Lowe]
If blindsight shows we don't need perceptual experiences, the causal theory is wrong [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 8. Adverbial Theory
How could one paraphrase very complex sense-data reports adverbially? [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
There are memories of facts, memories of practical skills, and autobiographical memory [Lowe]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism
Psychologists say illusions only occur in unnatural and passive situations [Lowe]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
The scandal of philosophy is expecting to prove reality when the prover's Being is vague [Heidegger]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / b. Purpose of mind
Having thoughts and feelings need engagement in the world [Heidegger, by Wrathall]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / d. Location of mind
Externalists say minds depend on environment for their very existence and identity [Lowe]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / e. Questions about mind
The main questions are: is mind distinct from body, and does it have unique properties? [Lowe]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
Dasein finds itself already amongst others [Heidegger, by Caputo]
If we work and play with other people, they are bound to be 'Dasein', intelligent agents [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 6. Anti-Individualism
When Dasein grasps something it exists externally alongside the thing [Heidegger]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / c. Parts of consciousness
'Phenomenal' consciousness is of qualities; 'apperceptive' consciousness includes beliefs and desires [Lowe]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 7. Blindsight
The brain may have two systems for vision, with only the older one intact in blindsight [Lowe]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 1. Existence of Persons
Persons are selves - subjects of experience, with reflexive self-knowledge [Lowe]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / b. Self as brain
If my brain could survive on its own, I cannot be identical with my whole body [Lowe]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
There is an everyday self, and an authentic self, when it is grasped in its own way [Heidegger]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
It seems impossible to get generally applicable mental concepts from self-observation [Lowe]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 3. Reference of 'I'
All human languages have an equivalent of the word 'I' [Lowe]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
Everyone is other, and no one is himself [Heidegger]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
If qualia are causally inert, how can we even know about them? [Lowe]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
You can only identify behaviour by ascribing belief, so the behaviour can't explain the belief [Lowe]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room
A computer program is equivalent to the person AND the manual [Lowe]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
Functionalism can't distinguish our experiences in spectrum inversion [Lowe]
Functionalism only discusses relational properties of mental states, not intrinsic properties [Lowe]
Functionalism commits us to bizarre possibilities, such as 'zombies' [Lowe]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
Non-reductive physicalism accepts token-token identity (not type-type) and asserts 'supervenience' of mind and brain [Lowe]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Physicalists must believe in narrow content (because thoughts are merely the brain states) [Lowe]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
Eliminativism is incoherent if it eliminates reason and truth as well as propositional attitudes [Lowe]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
Some behaviourists believe thought is just suppressed speech [Lowe]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / c. Role of emotions
Moods are more fundamentally revealing than theories - as when fear reveals a threat [Heidegger, by Polt]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
'Base rate neglect' makes people favour the evidence over its background [Lowe]
People are wildly inaccurate in estimating probabilities about an observed event [Lowe]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence
The 'Frame Problem' is how to program the appropriate application of general knowledge [Lowe]
Computers can't be rational, because they lack motivation and curiosity [Lowe]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / c. Turing Test
The Turing test is too behaviourist, and too verbal in its methods [Lowe]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
The naturalistic views of how content is created are the causal theory and the teleological theory [Lowe]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
Twin Earth cases imply that even beliefs about kinds of stuff are indexical [Lowe]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
The same proposition provides contents for the that-clause of an utterance and a belief [Lowe]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
If propositions are abstract entities, how can minds depend on their causal powers? [Lowe]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
The three main theories of action involve the will, or belief-plus-desire, or an agent [Lowe]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
Libet gives empirical support for the will, as a kind of 'executive' mental operation [Lowe]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
We feel belief and desire as reasons for choice, not causes of choice [Lowe]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
People's actions are explained either by their motives, or their reasons, or the causes [Lowe]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
We do not add value to naked things; its involvement is disclosed in understanding it [Heidegger]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
Dasein has the potential to be itself, but must be shown this in the midst of ordinariness [Heidegger]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 3. Angst
Anxiety reveals the possibility and individuality of Dasein [Heidegger]
Anxiety about death frees me to live my own life [Heidegger, by Wrathall]
Anxiety is the uncanniness felt when constantly fleeing from asserting one's own freedom [Heidegger, by Caputo]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 5. Existence-Essence
Being what it is (essentia) must be conceived in terms of Being (existence) [Heidegger]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 6. Authentic Self
Heidegger says we must either choose an inauthentic hero, or choose yourself as hero [Heidegger, by Critchley]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / e. Fideism
With respect to religion, reason is a blind whore [Luther]