82 ideas
2474 | It seems likely that analysis of concepts is impossible, but justification can survive without it [Fodor] |
2481 | Despite all the efforts of philosophers, nothing can ever be reduced to anything [Fodor] |
22223 | Being-in-the-world is projection to possibilities, thrownness among them, and fallenness within them [Heidegger, by Caputo] |
22158 | Pheomenology seeks things themselves, without empty theories, problems and concepts [Heidegger] |
15574 | 'Logos' really means 'making something manifest' [Heidegger, by Polt] |
2505 | Turing invented the idea of mechanical rationality (just based on syntax) [Fodor] |
2470 | Transcendental arguments move from knowing Q to knowing P because it depends on Q [Fodor] |
15569 | Heidegger says truth is historical, and never absolute [Heidegger, by Polt] |
21897 | Reducing being to the study of beings too readily accepts the modern scientific view [Heidegger, by May] |
15573 | For us, Being is constituted by awareness of other sorts of Being [Heidegger] |
9273 | Heidegger turns to 'Being' to affirm the uniqueness of humans in the world [Heidegger, by Gray] |
22157 | Dasein is a mode of Being distinguished by concern for its own Being [Heidegger] |
8137 | Dasein is ahead of itself in the world, and alongside encountered entities [Heidegger] |
21951 | In company with others one's Dasein dissolves, and even the others themselves dissolve [Heidegger] |
20745 | 'Dasein' expresses not 'what' the entity is, but its being [Heidegger] |
8134 | The word 'dasein' is used to mean 'the manner of Being which man possesses', and also the human creature [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE] |
8135 | 'Dasein' is Being which is laid claim to, and which matters to its owner [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE] |
21948 | Dasein is being which can understand itself, and possess itself in a way allowing authenticity [Heidegger] |
7680 | Ontology is possible only as phenomenology [Heidegger] |
22161 | Readiness-to-hand defines things in themselves ontologically [Heidegger] |
2469 | The world is full of messy small things producing stable large-scale properties (e.g. mountains) [Fodor] |
2475 | Don't define something by a good instance of it; a good example is a special case of the ordinary example [Fodor] |
15576 | Heidegger seeks a non-traditional concept of essence as 'essential unfolding' [Heidegger, by Polt] |
15578 | Propositions don't provide understanding, because the understanding must come first [Heidegger, by Polt] |
2502 | How do you count beliefs? [Fodor] |
22159 | If we posit 'I' as the starting point, we miss the mind's phenomenal content [Heidegger] |
22160 | Our relationship to a hammer strengthens when we use [Heidegger] |
2501 | Berkeley seems to have mistakenly thought that chairs are the same as after-images [Fodor] |
15580 | There are no raw sense-data - our experiences are of the sound or colour of something [Heidegger] |
20749 | Perceived objects always appear in a context [Heidegger] |
2465 | Maybe explaining the mechanics of perception will explain the concepts involved [Fodor] |
2504 | Rationalism can be based on an evolved computational brain with innate structure [Fodor] |
2493 | According to empiricists abstraction is the fundamental mental process [Fodor] |
2494 | Rationalists say there is more to a concept than the experience that prompts it [Fodor] |
22163 | The scandal of philosophy is expecting to prove reality when the prover's Being is vague [Heidegger] |
21949 | Having thoughts and feelings need engagement in the world [Heidegger, by Wrathall] |
2503 | Empirical approaches see mind connections as mirrors/maps of reality [Fodor] |
2508 | The function of a mind is obvious [Fodor] |
22222 | Dasein finds itself already amongst others [Heidegger, by Caputo] |
8136 | If we work and play with other people, they are bound to be 'Dasein', intelligent agents [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE] |
22164 | When Dasein grasps something it exists externally alongside the thing [Heidegger] |
2485 | Do intentional states explain our behaviour? [Fodor] |
2506 | If I have a set of mental modules, someone had better be in charge of them! [Fodor] |
22162 | There is an everyday self, and an authentic self, when it is grasped in its own way [Heidegger] |
20114 | Everyone is other, and no one is himself [Heidegger] |
2467 | Functionalists see pains as properties involving relations and causation [Fodor] |
2489 | Why bother with neurons? You don't explain bird flight by examining feathers [Fodor] |
2468 | Type physicalism is a stronger claim than token physicalism [Fodor] |
2490 | Modern connectionism is just Hume's theory of the 'association' of 'ideas' [Fodor] |
2476 | The goal of thought is to understand the world, not instantly sort it into conceptual categories [Fodor] |
15577 | Moods are more fundamentally revealing than theories - as when fear reveals a threat [Heidegger, by Polt] |
2499 | Modules analyse stimuli, they don't tell you what to do [Fodor] |
2496 | Blindness doesn't destroy spatial concepts [Fodor] |
2497 | Something must take an overview of the modules [Fodor] |
2509 | Modules have in-built specialist information [Fodor] |
2491 | Modules have encapsulation, inaccessibility, private concepts, innateness [Fodor] |
2495 | Obvious modules are language and commonsense explanation [Fodor] |
2498 | Modules make the world manageable [Fodor] |
2500 | Babies talk in consistent patterns [Fodor] |
2507 | Rationality rises above modules [Fodor] |
2480 | Language is ambiguous, but thought isn't [Fodor] |
2487 | Mentalese may also incorporate some natural language [Fodor] |
2483 | Mentalese doesn't require a theory of meaning [Fodor] |
2486 | Content can't be causal role, because causal role is decided by content [Fodor] |
2492 | Experience can't explain itself; the concepts needed must originate outside experience [Fodor] |
2471 | Are concepts best seen as capacities? [Fodor] |
2472 | For Pragmatists having a concept means being able to do something [Fodor] |
2482 | It seems unlikely that meaning can be reduced to communicative intentions, or any mental states [Fodor] |
2477 | If to understand "fish" you must know facts about them, where does that end? [Fodor] |
2473 | Analysis is impossible without the analytic/synthetic distinction [Fodor] |
2484 | The theory of the content of thought as 'Mentalese' explains why the Private Language Argument doesn't work [Fodor] |
20034 | Intentions must be mutually consistent, affirm appropriate means, and fit the agent's beliefs [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall] |
20033 | Intentions are normative, requiring commitment and further plans [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall] |
20026 | Intention is either the aim of an action, or a long-term constraint on what we can do [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall] |
20032 | Bratman rejected reducing intentions to belief-desire, because they motivate, and have their own standards [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall] |
20748 | We do not add value to naked things; its involvement is disclosed in understanding it [Heidegger] |
22166 | Dasein has the potential to be itself, but must be shown this in the midst of ordinariness [Heidegger] |
22165 | Anxiety reveals the possibility and individuality of Dasein [Heidegger] |
21952 | Anxiety about death frees me to live my own life [Heidegger, by Wrathall] |
22224 | Anxiety is the uncanniness felt when constantly fleeing from asserting one's own freedom [Heidegger, by Caputo] |
15572 | Being what it is (essentia) must be conceived in terms of Being (existence) [Heidegger] |
20453 | Heidegger says we must either choose an inauthentic hero, or choose yourself as hero [Heidegger, by Critchley] |