74 ideas
| 22223 | Being-in-the-world is projection to possibilities, thrownness among them, and fallenness within them [Heidegger, by Caputo] |
| 22158 | Pheomenology seeks things themselves, without empty theories, problems and concepts [Heidegger] |
| 15574 | 'Logos' really means 'making something manifest' [Heidegger, by Polt] |
| 15569 | Heidegger says truth is historical, and never absolute [Heidegger, by Polt] |
| 9449 | The plausible Barcan formula implies modality in the actual world [Bird] |
| 21897 | Reducing being to the study of beings too readily accepts the modern scientific view [Heidegger, by May] |
| 15573 | For us, Being is constituted by awareness of other sorts of Being [Heidegger] |
| 9273 | Heidegger turns to 'Being' to affirm the uniqueness of humans in the world [Heidegger, by Gray] |
| 22157 | Dasein is a mode of Being distinguished by concern for its own Being [Heidegger] |
| 8137 | Dasein is ahead of itself in the world, and alongside encountered entities [Heidegger] |
| 21951 | In company with others one's Dasein dissolves, and even the others themselves dissolve [Heidegger] |
| 20745 | 'Dasein' expresses not 'what' the entity is, but its being [Heidegger] |
| 8134 | The word 'dasein' is used to mean 'the manner of Being which man possesses', and also the human creature [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE] |
| 8135 | 'Dasein' is Being which is laid claim to, and which matters to its owner [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE] |
| 21948 | Dasein is being which can understand itself, and possess itself in a way allowing authenticity [Heidegger] |
| 7680 | Ontology is possible only as phenomenology [Heidegger] |
| 9501 | If all existents are causally active, that excludes abstracta and causally isolated objects [Bird] |
| 9500 | If naturalism refers to supervenience, that leaves necessary entities untouched [Bird] |
| 22161 | Readiness-to-hand defines things in themselves ontologically [Heidegger] |
| 9502 | There might be just one fundamental natural property [Bird] |
| 9477 | Categorical properties are not modally fixed, but change across possible worlds [Bird] |
| 9490 | The categoricalist idea is that a property is only individuated by being itself [Bird] |
| 9495 | If we abstractly define a property, that doesn't mean some object could possess it [Bird] |
| 9492 | Categoricalists take properties to be quiddities, with no essential difference between them [Bird] |
| 9503 | To name an abundant property is either a Fregean concept, or a simple predicate [Bird] |
| 14540 | Only real powers are fundamental [Bird, by Mumford/Anjum] |
| 9450 | If all properties are potencies, and stimuli and manifestation characterise them, there is a regress [Bird] |
| 9498 | The essence of a potency involves relations, e.g. mass, to impressed force and acceleration [Bird] |
| 9474 | A disposition is finkish if a time delay might mean the manifestation fizzles out [Bird] |
| 9475 | A robust pot attached to a sensitive bomb is not fragile, but if struck it will easily break [Bird] |
| 9499 | Megarian actualists deny unmanifested dispositions [Bird] |
| 8502 | Realism doesn't explain 'a is F' any further by saying it is 'a has F-ness' [Devitt] |
| 9486 | Why should a universal's existence depend on instantiation in an existing particular? [Bird] |
| 8503 | The particular/universal distinction is unhelpful clutter; we should accept 'a is F' as basic [Devitt] |
| 8501 | Quineans take predication about objects as basic, not reference to properties they may have [Devitt] |
| 9472 | Resemblance itself needs explanation, presumably in terms of something held in common [Bird] |
| 15576 | Heidegger seeks a non-traditional concept of essence as 'essential unfolding' [Heidegger, by Polt] |
| 9482 | If the laws necessarily imply p, that doesn't give a new 'nomological' necessity [Bird] |
| 9481 | Logical necessitation is not a kind of necessity; George Orwell not being Eric Blair is not a real possibility [Bird] |
| 9505 | Empiricist saw imaginability and possibility as close, but now they seem remote [Bird] |
| 9491 | Haecceitism says identity is independent of qualities and without essence [Bird] |
| 15578 | Propositions don't provide understanding, because the understanding must come first [Heidegger, by Polt] |
| 22159 | If we posit 'I' as the starting point, we miss the mind's phenomenal content [Heidegger] |
| 22160 | Our relationship to a hammer strengthens when we use [Heidegger] |
| 15580 | There are no raw sense-data - our experiences are of the sound or colour of something [Heidegger] |
| 20749 | Perceived objects always appear in a context [Heidegger] |
| 22163 | The scandal of philosophy is expecting to prove reality when the prover's Being is vague [Heidegger] |
| 9487 | We can't reject all explanations because of a regress; inexplicable A can still explain B [Bird] |
| 21949 | Having thoughts and feelings need engagement in the world [Heidegger, by Wrathall] |
| 22222 | Dasein finds itself already amongst others [Heidegger, by Caputo] |
| 8136 | If we work and play with other people, they are bound to be 'Dasein', intelligent agents [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE] |
| 22164 | When Dasein grasps something it exists externally alongside the thing [Heidegger] |
| 22162 | There is an everyday self, and an authentic self, when it is grasped in its own way [Heidegger] |
| 20114 | Everyone is other, and no one is himself [Heidegger] |
| 15577 | Moods are more fundamentally revealing than theories - as when fear reveals a threat [Heidegger, by Polt] |
| 20748 | We do not add value to naked things; its involvement is disclosed in understanding it [Heidegger] |
| 22166 | Dasein has the potential to be itself, but must be shown this in the midst of ordinariness [Heidegger] |
| 22165 | Anxiety reveals the possibility and individuality of Dasein [Heidegger] |
| 21952 | Anxiety about death frees me to live my own life [Heidegger, by Wrathall] |
| 22224 | Anxiety is the uncanniness felt when constantly fleeing from asserting one's own freedom [Heidegger, by Caputo] |
| 15572 | Being what it is (essentia) must be conceived in terms of Being (existence) [Heidegger] |
| 20453 | Heidegger says we must either choose an inauthentic hero, or choose yourself as hero [Heidegger, by Critchley] |
| 9493 | We should explain causation by powers, not powers by causation [Bird] |
| 9494 | Singularism about causes is wrong, as the universals involved imply laws [Bird] |
| 9507 | Laws are explanatory relationships of things, which supervene on their essences [Bird] |
| 9488 | Laws are either disposition regularities, or relations between properties [Bird] |
| 9496 | That other diamonds are hard does not explain why this one is [Bird] |
| 9479 | Dispositional essentialism says laws (and laws about laws) are guaranteed regularities [Bird] |
| 9473 | Laws cannot offer unified explanations if they don't involve universals [Bird] |
| 9484 | If the universals for laws must be instantiated, a vanishing particular could destroy a law [Bird] |
| 9506 | Salt necessarily dissolves in water, because of the law which makes the existence of salt possible [Bird] |
| 23713 | Most laws supervene on fundamental laws, which are explained by basic powers [Bird, by Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 9489 | Essentialism can't use conditionals to explain regularities, because of possible interventions [Bird] |
| 9504 | The relational view of space-time doesn't cover times and places where things could be [Bird] |