Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Being and Time', 'The Laws' and 'Foundations without Foundationalism'

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132 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
We shouldn't always follow where the argument leads! [Lewis on Plato]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 2. Phenomenology
Being-in-the-world is projection to possibilities, thrownness among them, and fallenness within them [Heidegger, by Caputo]
Pheomenology seeks things themselves, without empty theories, problems and concepts [Heidegger]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
It is foolish to quarrel with the mind's own reasoning processes [Plato]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
'Logos' really means 'making something manifest' [Heidegger, by Polt]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
We ought to follow where the argument leads us [Plato]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
Mortals are incapable of being fully rational [Plato]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Truth has the supreme value, for both gods and men [Plato]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 9. Rejecting Truth
Heidegger says truth is historical, and never absolute [Heidegger, by Polt]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
Satisfaction is 'truth in a model', which is a model of 'truth' [Shapiro]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 1. Aristotelian Logic
Aristotelian logic is complete [Shapiro]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / a. Types of set
A set is 'transitive' if contains every member of each of its members [Shapiro]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
Choice is essential for proving downward Löwenheim-Skolem [Shapiro]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / a. Sets as existing
Are sets part of logic, or part of mathematics? [Shapiro]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
Russell's paradox shows that there are classes which are not iterative sets [Shapiro]
It is central to the iterative conception that membership is well-founded, with no infinite descending chains [Shapiro]
Iterative sets are not Boolean; the complement of an iterative set is not an iterative sets [Shapiro]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 6. Ordering in Sets
'Well-ordering' of a set is an irreflexive, transitive, and binary relation with a least element [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
Logic is the ideal for learning new propositions on the basis of others [Shapiro]
There is no 'correct' logic for natural languages [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic
Skolem and Gödel championed first-order, and Zermelo, Hilbert, and Bernays championed higher-order [Shapiro]
Bernays (1918) formulated and proved the completeness of propositional logic [Shapiro]
Can one develop set theory first, then derive numbers, or are numbers more basic? [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
First-order logic was an afterthought in the development of modern logic [Shapiro]
The 'triumph' of first-order logic may be related to logicism and the Hilbert programme, which failed [Shapiro]
Maybe compactness, semantic effectiveness, and the Löwenheim-Skolem properties are desirable [Shapiro]
The notion of finitude is actually built into first-order languages [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
Second-order logic is better than set theory, since it only adds relations and operations, and nothing else [Shapiro, by Lavine]
Broad standard semantics, or Henkin semantics with a subclass, or many-sorted first-order semantics? [Shapiro]
Henkin semantics has separate variables ranging over the relations and over the functions [Shapiro]
In standard semantics for second-order logic, a single domain fixes the ranges for the variables [Shapiro]
Completeness, Compactness and Löwenheim-Skolem fail in second-order standard semantics [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 4. Semantic Consequence |=
If a logic is incomplete, its semantic consequence relation is not effective [Shapiro]
Semantic consequence is ineffective in second-order logic [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Finding the logical form of a sentence is difficult, and there are no criteria of correctness [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
We might reduce ontology by using truth of sentences and terms, instead of using objects satisfying models [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 4. Satisfaction
'Satisfaction' is a function from models, assignments, and formulas to {true,false} [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
Semantics for models uses set-theory [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 2. Isomorphisms
An axiomatization is 'categorical' if its models are isomorphic, so there is really only one interpretation [Shapiro]
Categoricity can't be reached in a first-order language [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
Downward Löwenheim-Skolem: each satisfiable countable set always has countable models [Shapiro]
Upward Löwenheim-Skolem: each infinite model has infinite models of all sizes [Shapiro]
The Löwenheim-Skolem theorems show an explosion of infinite models, so 1st-order is useless for infinity [Shapiro]
Substitutional semantics only has countably many terms, so Upward Löwenheim-Skolem trivially fails [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 3. Soundness
'Weakly sound' if every theorem is a logical truth; 'sound' if every deduction is a semantic consequence [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 4. Completeness
We can live well without completeness in logic [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 6. Compactness
Non-compactness is a strength of second-order logic, enabling characterisation of infinite structures [Shapiro]
Compactness is derived from soundness and completeness [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 9. Expressibility
A language is 'semantically effective' if its logical truths are recursively enumerable [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
Complex numbers can be defined as reals, which are defined as rationals, then integers, then naturals [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / d. Natural numbers
Only higher-order languages can specify that 0,1,2,... are all the natural numbers that there are [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
Natural numbers are the finite ordinals, and integers are equivalence classes of pairs of finite ordinals [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / g. Continuum Hypothesis
The 'continuum' is the cardinality of the powerset of a denumerably infinite set [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
First-order arithmetic can't even represent basic number theory [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
Some sets of natural numbers are definable in set-theory but not in arithmetic [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
Logicism is distinctive in seeking a universal language, and denying that logic is a series of abstractions [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Mathematics and logic have no border, and logic must involve mathematics and its ontology [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / d. Predicativism
Some reject formal properties if they are not defined, or defined impredicatively [Shapiro]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
Reducing being to the study of beings too readily accepts the modern scientific view [Heidegger, by May]
For us, Being is constituted by awareness of other sorts of Being [Heidegger]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / h. Dasein (being human)
Heidegger turns to 'Being' to affirm the uniqueness of humans in the world [Heidegger, by Gray]
Dasein is a mode of Being distinguished by concern for its own Being [Heidegger]
Dasein is ahead of itself in the world, and alongside encountered entities [Heidegger]
In company with others one's Dasein dissolves, and even the others themselves dissolve [Heidegger]
'Dasein' expresses not 'what' the entity is, but its being [Heidegger]
The word 'dasein' is used to mean 'the manner of Being which man possesses', and also the human creature [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE]
'Dasein' is Being which is laid claim to, and which matters to its owner [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE]
Dasein is being which can understand itself, and possess itself in a way allowing authenticity [Heidegger]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Ontology is possible only as phenomenology [Heidegger]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Readiness-to-hand defines things in themselves ontologically [Heidegger]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
Properties are often seen as intensional; equiangular and equilateral are different, despite identity of objects [Shapiro]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Heidegger seeks a non-traditional concept of essence as 'essential unfolding' [Heidegger, by Polt]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
To grasp a thing we need its name, its definition, and what it really is [Plato]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Propositions don't provide understanding, because the understanding must come first [Heidegger, by Polt]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. Cogito Critique
If we posit 'I' as the starting point, we miss the mind's phenomenal content [Heidegger]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
Our relationship to a hammer strengthens when we use [Heidegger]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
There are no raw sense-data - our experiences are of the sound or colour of something [Heidegger]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
Perceived objects always appear in a context [Heidegger]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
The scandal of philosophy is expecting to prove reality when the prover's Being is vague [Heidegger]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / b. Purpose of mind
Having thoughts and feelings need engagement in the world [Heidegger, by Wrathall]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
Soul is what is defined by 'self-generating motion' [Plato]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
Dasein finds itself already amongst others [Heidegger, by Caputo]
If we work and play with other people, they are bound to be 'Dasein', intelligent agents [Heidegger, by Cooper,DE]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 6. Anti-Individualism
When Dasein grasps something it exists externally alongside the thing [Heidegger]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 3. Self as Non-physical
My individuality is my soul, which carries my body around [Plato]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
There is an everyday self, and an authentic self, when it is grasped in its own way [Heidegger]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
Everyone is other, and no one is himself [Heidegger]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / c. Role of emotions
Moods are more fundamentally revealing than theories - as when fear reveals a threat [Heidegger, by Polt]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
People who value beauty above virtue insult the soul by placing the body above it [Plato]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
We do not add value to naked things; its involvement is disclosed in understanding it [Heidegger]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
An action is only just if it is performed by someone with a just character and outlook [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / i. Moral luck
Attempted murder is like real murder, but we should respect the luck which avoided total ruin [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
It would be strange if the gods rewarded those who experienced the most pleasure in life [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / f. Dangers of pleasure
The conquest of pleasure is the noblest victory of all [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Every crime is the result of excessive self-love [Plato]
The only worthwhile life is one devoted to physical and moral perfection [Plato]
Virtue is a concord of reason and emotion, with pleasure and pain trained to correct ends [Plato]
A serious desire for moral excellence is very rare indeed [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
Virtue is the aim of all laws [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
The Guardians must aim to discover the common element in the four cardinal virtues [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / b. Temperance
Excessive laughter and tears must be avoided [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
Injustice is the mastery of the soul by bad feelings, even if they do not lead to harm [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
Virtue and great wealth are incompatible [Plato]
The best people are produced where there is no excess of wealth or poverty [Plato]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
Dasein has the potential to be itself, but must be shown this in the midst of ordinariness [Heidegger]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 3. Angst
Anxiety reveals the possibility and individuality of Dasein [Heidegger]
Anxiety about death frees me to live my own life [Heidegger, by Wrathall]
Anxiety is the uncanniness felt when constantly fleeing from asserting one's own freedom [Heidegger, by Caputo]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 5. Existence-Essence
Being what it is (essentia) must be conceived in terms of Being (existence) [Heidegger]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 6. Authentic Self
Heidegger says we must either choose an inauthentic hero, or choose yourself as hero [Heidegger, by Critchley]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / c. Despotism
Totalitarian states destroy friendships and community spirit [Plato]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
Education in virtue produces citizens who are active but obedient [Plato]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
Men and women should qualify equally for honours on merit [Plato]
Friendship is impossible between master and slave, even if they are made equal [Plato]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Sound laws achieve the happiness of those who observe them [Plato]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
Justice is granting the equality which unequals deserve [Plato]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Children's games should channel their pleasures into adult activity [Plato]
Control of education is the key office of state, and should go to the best citizen [Plato]
Mathematics has the widest application of any subject on the curriculum [Plato]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
Education is channelling a child's feelings into the right course before it understands why [Plato]
The best way to educate the young is not to rebuke them, but to set a good example [Plato]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / a. Final purpose
Creation is not for you; you exist for the sake of creation [Plato]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 3. The Beginning
Movement is transmitted through everything, and it must have started with self-generated motion [Plato]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
In 'The Laws', to obey the law is to be obey god [Plato, by MacIntyre]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / a. Cosmological Proof
Self-generating motion is clearly superior to all other kinds of motion [Plato]
The only possible beginning for the endless motions of reality is something self-generated [Plato]
Self-moving soul has to be the oldest thing there is [Plato]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
Soul must be the cause of all the opposites, such as good and evil or beauty and ugliness [Plato]
If all the motions of nature reflect calculations of reason, then the best kind of soul must direct it [Plato]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
If astronomical movements are seen as necessary instead of by divine will, this leads to atheism [Plato]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 1. Animism
The heavens must be full of gods, controlling nature either externally or from within [Plato]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 4. Dualist Religion
There must be at least two souls controlling the cosmos, one doing good, the other the opposite [Plato]