11 ideas
21953 | For Heidegger there is 'ontic' truth or 'uncoveredness', as in "he is a true friend" [Heidegger, by Wrathall] |
18823 | To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt] |
11993 | Jones may cease to exist without some simple property, but that doesn't make it essential [Kung] |
11997 | A property may belong essentially to one thing and contingently to another [Kung] |
11992 | Aristotelian essences underlie a thing's existence, explain it, and must belong to it [Kung] |
16409 | Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker] |
16411 | If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker] |
16412 | If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker] |
11995 | Some peripheral properties are explained by essential ones, but don't themselves explain properties [Kung] |
11996 | Some non-essential properties may explain more than essential-but-peripheral ones do [Kung] |
16410 | Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker] |