Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Origin of the Work of Art', 'Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity' and 'Objects and Persons'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

41 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent
15585 Later Heidegger sees philosophy as more like poetry than like science [Heidegger, by Polt]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
6123 Empirical investigation can't discover if holes exist, or if two things share a colour [Merricks]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
6143 Prolonged events don't seem to endure or exist at any particular time [Merricks]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
6135 A crumbling statue can't become vague, because vagueness is incoherent [Merricks]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
6145 Intrinsic properties are those an object still has even if only that object exists [Merricks]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
6124 I say that most of the objects of folk ontology do not exist [Merricks]
6134 Is swimming pool water an object, composed of its mass or parts? [Merricks]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
6125 We can eliminate objects without a commitment to simples [Merricks]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
14508 A 'thisness' is a thing's property of being identical with itself (not the possession of self-identity) [Adams,RM]
14511 There are cases where mere qualities would not ensure an intrinsic identity [Adams,RM]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
14229 Merricks agrees that there are no composite objects, but offers a different semantics [Merricks, by Liggins]
6142 The 'folk' way of carving up the world is not intrinsically better than quite arbitrary ways [Merricks]
14472 If atoms 'arranged baseballwise' break a window, that analytically entails that a baseball did it [Merricks, by Thomasson]
14469 Overdetermination: the atoms do all the causing, so the baseball causes no breakage [Merricks]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
6137 Clay does not 'constitute' a statue, as they have different persistence conditions (flaking, squashing) [Merricks]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
6141 There is no visible difference between statues, and atoms arranged statuewise [Merricks]
6127 'Unrestricted composition' says any two things can make up a third thing [Merricks]
6131 Composition as identity is false, as identity is never between a single thing and many things [Merricks]
6132 Composition as identity is false, as it implies that things never change their parts [Merricks]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
6130 'Composition' says things are their parts; 'constitution' says a whole substance is an object [Merricks]
6138 It seems wrong that constitution entails that two objects are wholly co-located [Merricks]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
6128 Objects decompose (it seems) into non-overlapping parts that fill its whole region [Merricks]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
12031 Essences are taken to be qualitative properties [Adams,RM]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 13. No Identity over Time
6136 Eliminativism about objects gives the best understanding of the Sorites paradox [Merricks]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
12034 If the universe was cyclical, totally indiscernible events might occur from time to time [Adams,RM]
14510 Two events might be indiscernible yet distinct, if there was a universe cyclical in time [Adams,RM]
16455 Black's two globes might be one globe in highly curved space [Adams,RM]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
14507 Are possible worlds just qualities, or do they include primitive identities as well? [Adams,RM]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / b. Worlds as fictions
11964 Possible worlds are world-stories, maximal descriptions of whole non-existent worlds [Adams,RM, by Molnar]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
6133 If my counterpart is happy, that is irrelevant to whether I 'could' have been happy [Merricks]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
16451 Adams says anti-haecceitism reduces all thisness to suchness [Adams,RM, by Stalnaker]
11901 Haecceitism may or may not involve some logical connection to essence [Adams,RM, by Mackie,P]
14512 Moderate Haecceitism says transworld identities are primitive, but connected to qualities [Adams,RM]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
6150 The 'warrant' for a belief is what turns a true belief into knowledge [Merricks]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
6144 You hold a child in your arms, so it is not mental substance, or mental state, or software [Merricks]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 3. Reference of 'I'
6140 Maybe the word 'I' can only refer to persons [Merricks]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
6149 Free will and determinism are incompatible, since determinism destroys human choice [Merricks]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
6148 Human organisms can exercise downward causation [Merricks]
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
6147 The hypothesis of solipsism doesn't seem to be made incoherent by the nature of mental properties [Merricks]
6146 Before Creation it is assumed that God still had many many mental properties [Merricks]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference
12032 Direct reference is by proper names, or indexicals, or referential uses of descriptions [Adams,RM]