18 ideas
15585 | Later Heidegger sees philosophy as more like poetry than like science [Heidegger, by Polt] |
22138 | Science rests on scholastic metaphysics, not on Hume, Kant or Carnap [Boulter] |
18928 | If maximalism is necessary, then that nothing exists has a truthmaker, which it can't have [Cameron] |
18931 | Determinate truths don't need extra truthmakers, just truthmakers that are themselves determinate [Cameron] |
18932 | The facts about the existence of truthmakers can't have a further explanation [Cameron] |
18923 | The present property 'having been F' says nothing about a thing's intrinsic nature [Cameron] |
18926 | One temporal distibution property grounds our present and past truths [Cameron] |
18929 | We don't want present truthmakers for the past, if they are about to cease to exist! [Cameron] |
18924 | Being polka-dotted is a 'spatial distribution' property [Cameron] |
22134 | Thoughts are general, but the world isn't, so how can we think accurately? [Boulter] |
18930 | Change is instantiation of a non-uniform distributional property, like 'being red-then-orange' [Cameron] |
22150 | Logical possibility needs the concepts of the proposition to be adequate [Boulter] |
22139 | Experiments don't just observe; they look to see what interventions change the natural order [Boulter] |
22136 | Science begins with sufficient reason, de-animation, and the importance of nature [Boulter] |
22135 | Our concepts can never fully capture reality, but simplification does not falsify [Boulter] |
22152 | Aristotelians accept the analytic-synthetic distinction [Boulter] |
22156 | The facts about human health are the measure of the values in our lives [Boulter] |
18927 | Surely if things extend over time, then time itself must be extended? [Cameron] |