27 ideas
3993 | Arguments are nearly always open to challenge, but they help to explain a position rather than force people to believe [Lewis] |
10702 | Set theory's three roles: taming the infinite, subject-matter of mathematics, and modes of reasoning [Potter] |
10713 | Usually the only reason given for accepting the empty set is convenience [Potter] |
13044 | Infinity: There is at least one limit level [Potter] |
10708 | Nowadays we derive our conception of collections from the dependence between them [Potter] |
13546 | The 'limitation of size' principles say whether properties collectivise depends on the number of objects [Potter] |
10707 | Mereology elides the distinction between the cards in a pack and the suits [Potter] |
10704 | We can formalize second-order formation rules, but not inference rules [Potter] |
10703 | Supposing axioms (rather than accepting them) give truths, but they are conditional [Potter] |
10712 | If set theory didn't found mathematics, it is still needed to count infinite sets [Potter] |
17882 | It is remarkable that all natural number arithmetic derives from just the Peano Axioms [Potter] |
3990 | The whole truth supervenes on the physical truth [Lewis] |
3991 | Where pixels make up a picture, supervenience is reduction [Lewis] |
13043 | A relation is a set consisting entirely of ordered pairs [Potter] |
13042 | If dependence is well-founded, with no infinite backward chains, this implies substances [Potter] |
13041 | Collections have fixed members, but fusions can be carved in innumerable ways [Potter] |
10709 | Priority is a modality, arising from collections and members [Potter] |
3995 | A mind is an organ of representation [Lewis] |
20618 | Persons must be conscious, reasoning, motivated, communicative, self-aware [Warren, by Tuckness/Wolf] |
3994 | Human pain might be one thing; Martian pain might be something else [Lewis] |
3989 | I am a reductionist about mind because I am an a priori reductionist about everything [Lewis] |
3992 | Folk psychology makes good predictions, by associating mental states with causal roles [Lewis] |
3996 | Folk psychology doesn't say that there is a language of thought [Lewis] |
3998 | If you don't share an external world with a brain-in-a-vat, then externalism says you don't share any beliefs [Lewis] |
3997 | Nothing shows that all content is 'wide', or that wide content has logical priority [Lewis] |
3999 | A spontaneous duplicate of you would have your brain states but no experience, so externalism would deny him any beliefs [Lewis] |
4000 | Wide content derives from narrow content and relationships with external things [Lewis] |