53 ideas
12027 | There must be a plausible epistemological theory alongside any metaphysical theory [Forbes,G] |
6979 | Serious metaphysics cares about entailment between sentences [Jackson] |
6980 | Conceptual analysis studies whether one story is made true by another story [Jackson] |
6983 | Intuitions about possibilities are basic to conceptual analysis [Jackson] |
14707 | Conceptual analysis is needed to establish that metaphysical reductions respect original meanings [Jackson, by Schroeter] |
7005 | Something can only have a place in a preferred account of things if it is entailed by the account [Jackson] |
6994 | Truth supervenes on being [Jackson] |
12005 | The symbol 'ι' forms definite descriptions; (ιx)F(x) says 'the x which is such that F(x)' [Forbes,G] |
12010 | Is the meaning of 'and' given by its truth table, or by its introduction and elimination rules? [Forbes,G] |
6984 | Smooth reductions preserve high-level laws in the lower level [Jackson] |
6978 | Baldness is just hair distribution, but the former is indeterminate, unlike the latter [Jackson] |
12023 | Vagueness problems arise from applying sharp semantics to vague languages [Forbes,G] |
6993 | Redness is a property, but only as a presentation to normal humans [Jackson] |
12017 | In all instances of identity, there must be some facts to ensure the identity [Forbes,G] |
12024 | If we combined two clocks, it seems that two clocks may have become one clock. [Forbes,G] |
11885 | Only individual essences will ground identities across worlds in other properties [Forbes,G, by Mackie,P] |
12014 | An individual essence is a set of essential properties which only that object can have [Forbes,G] |
12015 | Non-trivial individual essence is properties other than de dicto, or universal, or relational [Forbes,G] |
12013 | Essential properties depend on a category, and perhaps also on particular facts [Forbes,G] |
12012 | Essential properties are those without which an object could not exist [Forbes,G] |
12022 | Same parts does not ensure same artefact, if those parts could constitute a different artefact [Forbes,G] |
12025 | Artefacts have fuzzy essences [Forbes,G] |
12020 | An individual might change their sex in a world, but couldn't have differed in sex at origin [Forbes,G] |
11888 | Identities must hold because of other facts, which must be instrinsic [Forbes,G, by Mackie,P] |
6987 | We should not multiply senses of necessity beyond necessity [Jackson] |
12003 | De re modal formulae, unlike de dicto, are sensitive to transworld identities [Forbes,G] |
12028 | De re necessity is a form of conceptual necessity, just as de dicto necessity is [Forbes,G] |
12008 | Unlike places and times, we cannot separate possible worlds from what is true at them [Forbes,G] |
12009 | The problem with possible worlds realism is epistemological; we can't know properties of possible objects [Forbes,G] |
6988 | Mathematical sentences are a problem in a possible-worlds framework [Jackson] |
12007 | Possible worlds are points of logical space, rather like other times than our own [Forbes,G] |
6975 | Possible worlds could be concrete, abstract, universals, sentences, or properties [Jackson] |
12011 | Transworld identity concerns the limits of possibility for ordinary things [Forbes,G] |
12016 | The problem of transworld identity can be solved by individual essences [Forbes,G] |
12004 | Counterpart theory is not good at handling the logic of identity [Forbes,G] |
12021 | Haecceitism attributes to each individual a primitive identity or thisness [Forbes,G] |
12029 | We believe in thisnesses, because we reject bizarre possibilities as not being about that individual [Forbes,G] |
6982 | Long arithmetic calculations show the a priori can be fallible [Jackson] |
6991 | We examine objects to determine colour; we do not introspect [Jackson] |
6976 | In physicalism, the psychological depends on the physical, not the other way around [Jackson] |
6986 | Is the dependence of the psychological on the physical a priori or a posteriori? [Jackson] |
6992 | If different states can fulfil the same role, the converse must also be possible [Jackson] |
6996 | Folk psychology covers input, internal role, and output [Jackson] |
6977 | Egocentric or de se content seems to be irreducibly so [Jackson] |
6990 | Keep distinct the essential properties of water, and application conditions for the word 'water' [Jackson] |
6985 | Analysis is finding necessary and sufficient conditions by studying possible cases [Jackson] |
6995 | Successful predication supervenes on nature [Jackson] |
6989 | I can understand "He has a beard", without identifying 'he', and hence the truth conditions [Jackson] |
6998 | Folk morality does not clearly distinguish between doing and allowing [Jackson] |
6997 | Moral functionalism says moral terms get their meaning from their role in folk morality [Jackson] |
7000 | Which are prior - thin concepts like right, good, ought; or thick concepts like kindness, equity etc.? [Jackson] |
7825 | The politics of Leibniz was the reunification of Christianity [Stewart,M] |
6999 | It is hard to justify the huge difference in our judgements of abortion and infanticide [Jackson] |