14 ideas
12452 | Our dislike of contradiction in logic is a matter of psychology, not mathematics [Brouwer] |
10631 | If 'x is heterological' iff it does not apply to itself, then 'heterological' is heterological if it isn't heterological [Hale/Wright] |
12451 | Scientific laws largely rest on the results of counting and measuring [Brouwer] |
10624 | The incompletability of formal arithmetic reveals that logic also cannot be completely characterized [Hale/Wright] |
10629 | If structures are relative, this undermines truth-value and objectivity [Hale/Wright] |
10628 | The structural view of numbers doesn't fit their usage outside arithmetical contexts [Hale/Wright] |
10622 | The neo-Fregean is more optimistic than Frege about contextual definitions of numbers [Hale/Wright] |
12454 | Intuitionists only accept denumerable sets [Brouwer] |
12453 | Neo-intuitionism abstracts from the reuniting of moments, to intuit bare two-oneness [Brouwer] |
10626 | Objects just are what singular terms refer to [Hale/Wright] |
10630 | Abstracted objects are not mental creations, but depend on equivalence between given entities [Hale/Wright] |
10117 | Intuitonists in mathematics worried about unjustified assertion, as well as contradiction [Brouwer, by George/Velleman] |
10627 | Many conceptual truths ('yellow is extended') are not analytic, as derived from logic and definitions [Hale/Wright] |
7825 | The politics of Leibniz was the reunification of Christianity [Stewart,M] |