Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Identity of Indiscernibles', 'Change in View: Principles of Reasoning' and 'Logicism Revisited'

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22 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
19304 The rules of reasoning are not the rules of logic [Harman]
19306 It is a principle of reasoning not to clutter your mind with trivialities [Harman]
19307 If there is a great cost to avoiding inconsistency, we learn to reason our way around it [Harman]
19309 Logic has little relevance to reasoning, except when logical conclusions are immediate [Harman]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
19303 Implication just accumulates conclusions, but inference may also revise our views [Harman]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
10196 The Axiom of Choice needs a criterion of choice [Black]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
10065 Perhaps If-thenism survives in mathematics if we stick to first-order logic [Musgrave]
10061 The If-thenist view only seems to work for the axiomatised portions of mathematics [Musgrave]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
10050 A statement is logically true if it comes out true in all interpretations in all (non-empty) domains [Musgrave]
10049 Logical truths may contain non-logical notions, as in 'all men are men' [Musgrave]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
10058 No two numbers having the same successor relies on the Axiom of Infinity [Musgrave]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
10063 Formalism is a bulwark of logical positivism [Musgrave]
10062 Formalism seems to exclude all creative, growing mathematics [Musgrave]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties
10194 Two things can only be distinguished by a distinct property or a distinct relation [Black]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
10193 The 'property' of self-identity is uselessly tautological [Black]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
10195 If the universe just held two indiscernibles spheres, that refutes the Identity of Indiscernibles [Black]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
19305 The Gambler's Fallacy (ten blacks, so red is due) overemphasises the early part of a sequence [Harman]
19310 High probability premises need not imply high probability conclusions [Harman]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
19308 We strongly desire to believe what is true, even though logic does not require it [Harman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
19311 In revision of belief, we need to keep track of justifications for foundations, but not for coherence [Harman]
19312 Coherence is intelligible connections, especially one element explaining another [Harman]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
10060 Logical positivists adopted an If-thenist version of logicism about numbers [Musgrave]