Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Identity of Indiscernibles', 'Essential Attribution' and 'Free Will as Involving Determinism'

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16 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
10196 The Axiom of Choice needs a criterion of choice [Black]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties
10194 Two things can only be distinguished by a distinct property or a distinct relation [Black]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
11181 Aristotelian essentialism involves a 'natural' or 'causal' interpretation of modal operators [Marcus (Barcan)]
11184 Aristotelian essentialism is about shared properties, individuating essentialism about distinctive properties [Marcus (Barcan)]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
11180 Essentialist sentences are not theorems of modal logic, and can even be false [Marcus (Barcan)]
11186 'Essentially' won't replace 'necessarily' for vacuous properties like snub-nosed or self-identical [Marcus (Barcan)]
11185 'Is essentially' has a different meaning from 'is necessarily', as they often cannot be substituted [Marcus (Barcan)]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
11182 If essences are objects with only essential properties, they are elusive in possible worlds [Marcus (Barcan)]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
10193 The 'property' of self-identity is uselessly tautological [Black]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
10195 If the universe just held two indiscernibles spheres, that refutes the Identity of Indiscernibles [Black]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
11183 The use of possible worlds is to sort properties (not to individuate objects) [Marcus (Barcan)]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
11187 In possible worlds, names are just neutral unvarying pegs for truths and predicates [Marcus (Barcan)]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
22371 Determinism threatens free will if actions can be causally traced to external factors [Foot]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
22372 Not all actions need motives, but it is irrational to perform troublesome actions with no motive [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
22373 People can act out of vanity without being vain, or even vain about this kind of thing [Foot]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
11189 Dispositional essences are special, as if an object loses them they cease to exist [Marcus (Barcan)]