21 ideas
21704 | 'Impredictative' definitions fix a class in terms of the greater class to which it belongs [Linsky,B] |
10365 | We might use 'facta' to refer to the truth-makers for facts [Mellor, by Schaffer,J] |
15375 | If terms change their designations in different states, they are functions from states to objects [Fitting] |
15376 | Intensional logic adds a second type of quantification, over intensional objects, or individual concepts [Fitting] |
15378 | Awareness logic adds the restriction of an awareness function to epistemic logic [Fitting] |
15379 | Justication logics make explicit the reasons for mathematical truth in proofs [Fitting] |
21705 | Reducibility says any impredicative function has an appropriate predicative replacement [Linsky,B] |
11026 | Classical logic is deliberately extensional, in order to model mathematics [Fitting] |
21727 | Definite descriptions theory eliminates the King of France, but not the Queen of England [Linsky,B] |
11028 | λ-abstraction disambiguates the scope of modal operators [Fitting] |
21719 | Extensionalism means what is true of a function is true of coextensive functions [Linsky,B] |
21723 | The task of logicism was to define by logic the concepts 'number', 'successor' and '0' [Linsky,B] |
21721 | Higher types are needed to distinguished intensional phenomena which are coextensive [Linsky,B] |
21703 | Types are 'ramified' when there are further differences between the type of quantifier and its range [Linsky,B] |
21714 | The ramified theory subdivides each type, according to the range of the variables [Linsky,B] |
21713 | Did logicism fail, when Russell added three nonlogical axioms, to save mathematics? [Linsky,B] |
21715 | For those who abandon logicism, standard set theory is a rival option [Linsky,B] |
21729 | Construct properties as sets of objects, or say an object must be in the set to have the property [Linsky,B] |
15377 | Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds [Fitting] |
4785 | Causal statements relate facts (which are whatever true propositions express) [Mellor, by Psillos] |
8408 | Probabilistic causation says C is a cause of E if it increases the chances of E occurring [Mellor, by Tooley] |