40 ideas
15557 | Verisimilitude has proved hard to analyse, and seems to have several components [Lewis] |
15375 | If terms change their designations in different states, they are functions from states to objects [Fitting] |
15376 | Intensional logic adds a second type of quantification, over intensional objects, or individual concepts [Fitting] |
15378 | Awareness logic adds the restriction of an awareness function to epistemic logic [Fitting] |
15379 | Justication logics make explicit the reasons for mathematical truth in proofs [Fitting] |
9570 | In Field's Platonist view, set theory is false because it asserts existence for non-existent things [Field,H, by Chihara] |
11026 | Classical logic is deliberately extensional, in order to model mathematics [Fitting] |
10260 | Logical consequence is defined by the impossibility of P and ¬q [Field,H, by Shapiro] |
11028 | λ-abstraction disambiguates the scope of modal operators [Fitting] |
8958 | In Field's version of science, space-time points replace real numbers [Field,H, by Szabó] |
18221 | 'Metric' axioms uses functions, points and numbers; 'synthetic' axioms give facts about space [Field,H] |
8757 | The Indispensability Argument is the only serious ground for the existence of mathematical entities [Field,H] |
18212 | Nominalists try to only refer to physical objects, or language, or mental constructions [Field,H] |
10261 | The application of mathematics only needs its possibility, not its truth [Field,H, by Shapiro] |
18218 | Hilbert explains geometry, by non-numerical facts about space [Field,H] |
9623 | Field needs a semantical notion of second-order consequence, and that needs sets [Brown,JR on Field,H] |
18215 | It seems impossible to explain the idea that the conclusion is contained in the premises [Field,H] |
18216 | Abstractions can form useful counterparts to concrete statements [Field,H] |
18214 | Mathematics is only empirical as regards which theory is useful [Field,H] |
18210 | Why regard standard mathematics as truths, rather than as interesting fictions? [Field,H] |
18211 | You can reduce ontological commitment by expanding the logic [Field,H] |
8959 | Field presumes properties can be eliminated from science [Field,H, by Szabó] |
15554 | A disposition needs a causal basis, a property in a certain causal role. Could the disposition be the property? [Lewis] |
18213 | Abstract objects are only applicable to the world if they are impure, and connect to the physical [Field,H] |
15560 | We can explain a chance event, but can never show why some other outcome did not occur [Lewis] |
15377 | Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds [Fitting] |
15559 | Does a good explanation produce understanding? That claim is just empty [Lewis] |
18222 | Beneath every extrinsic explanation there is an intrinsic explanation [Field,H] |
15556 | Science may well pursue generalised explanation, rather than laws [Lewis] |
15558 | A good explanation is supposed to show that the event had to happen [Lewis] |
4809 | Lewis endorses the thesis that all explanation of singular events is causal explanation [Lewis, by Psillos] |
14321 | To explain an event is to provide some information about its causal history [Lewis] |
9917 | 'Abstract' is unclear, but numbers, functions and sets are clearly abstract [Field,H] |
15555 | Explaining match lighting in general is like explaining one lighting of a match [Lewis] |
15551 | Ways of carving causes may be natural, but never 'right' [Lewis] |
15552 | We only pick 'the' cause for the purposes of some particular enquiry. [Lewis] |
15553 | Causal dependence is counterfactual dependence between events [Lewis] |
18223 | In theories of fields, space-time points or regions are causal agents [Field,H] |
18220 | Both philosophy and physics now make substantivalism more attractive [Field,H] |
18219 | Relational space is problematic if you take the idea of a field seriously [Field,H] |