Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Intensional Logic', 'Truth-makers and dependence' and 'Preface to Universal Characteristic'

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17 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
2118 All other human gifts can harm us, but not correct reasoning [Leibniz]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
17325 Truth-maker theory can't cope with non-causal dependence [Liggins]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
17318 Truthmakers for existence is fine; otherwise maybe restrict it to synthetic truths? [Liggins]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 8. Intensional Logic
15375 If terms change their designations in different states, they are functions from states to objects [Fitting]
15376 Intensional logic adds a second type of quantification, over intensional objects, or individual concepts [Fitting]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 9. Awareness Logic
15378 Awareness logic adds the restriction of an awareness function to epistemic logic [Fitting]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 10. Justification Logics
15379 Justication logics make explicit the reasons for mathematical truth in proofs [Fitting]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 8. Logic of Mathematics
11026 Classical logic is deliberately extensional, in order to model mathematics [Fitting]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 3. Property (λ-) Abstraction
11028 λ-abstraction disambiguates the scope of modal operators [Fitting]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
17320 Either p is true or not-p is true, so something is true, so something exists [Liggins]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
17326 The dependence of {Socrates} on Socrates involves a set and a philosopher, not facts [Liggins]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
17327 Non-causal dependence is at present only dimly understood [Liggins]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
17322 Necessities supervene on everything, but don't depend on everything [Liggins]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
15377 Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds [Fitting]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
17324 'Because' can signal an inference rather than an explanation [Liggins]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
17321 Value, constitution and realisation are non-causal dependences that explain [Liggins]
17323 If explanations track dependence, then 'determinative' explanations seem to exist [Liggins]