36 ideas
| 3035 | Dialectic involves conversations with short questions and brief answers [Diog. Laertius] |
| 15375 | If terms change their designations in different states, they are functions from states to objects [Fitting] |
| 15376 | Intensional logic adds a second type of quantification, over intensional objects, or individual concepts [Fitting] |
| 15378 | Awareness logic adds the restriction of an awareness function to epistemic logic [Fitting] |
| 15379 | Justication logics make explicit the reasons for mathematical truth in proofs [Fitting] |
| 13258 | The 'aggregative' objections says mereology gets existence and location of objects wrong [Koslicki] |
| 11026 | Classical logic is deliberately extensional, in order to model mathematics [Fitting] |
| 13288 | Consequence is truth-preserving, either despite substitutions, or in all interpretations [Koslicki] |
| 14506 | 'Roses are red; therefore, roses are colored' seems truth-preserving, but not valid in a system [Koslicki] |
| 11028 | λ-abstraction disambiguates the scope of modal operators [Fitting] |
| 14505 | Some questions concern mathematical entities, rather than whole structures [Koslicki] |
| 13289 | Structures have positions, constituent types and number, and some invariable parts [Koslicki] |
| 14501 | 'Categorical' properties exist in the actual world, and 'hypothetical' properties in other worlds [Koslicki] |
| 14495 | I aim to put the notion of structure or form back into the concepts of part, whole and object [Koslicki] |
| 13264 | If a whole is just a structure, a dinner party wouldn't need the guests to turn up [Koslicki] |
| 14497 | The clay is just a part of the statue (its matter); the rest consists of its form or structure [Koslicki] |
| 13280 | Statue and clay differ in modal and temporal properties, and in constitution [Koslicki] |
| 14496 | Structure or form are right at the centre of modern rigorous modes of enquiry [Koslicki] |
| 13279 | There are at least six versions of constitution being identity [Koslicki] |
| 14498 | For three-dimensionalist parthood must be a three-place relation, including times [Koslicki] |
| 13283 | The parts may be the same type as the whole, like a building made of buildings [Koslicki] |
| 13266 | Wholes in modern mereology are intended to replace sets, so they closely resemble them [Koslicki] |
| 14500 | Wholes are entities distinct from their parts, and have different properties [Koslicki] |
| 13281 | Wholes are not just their parts; a whole is an entity distinct from the proper parts [Koslicki] |
| 15377 | Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds [Fitting] |
| 1816 | Sceptics say demonstration depends on self-demonstrating things, or indemonstrable things [Diog. Laertius] |
| 1819 | Scepticism has two dogmas: that nothing is definable, and every argument has an opposite argument [Diog. Laertius] |
| 3064 | When sceptics say that nothing is definable, or all arguments have an opposite, they are being dogmatic [Diog. Laertius] |
| 3033 | Induction moves from some truths to similar ones, by contraries or consequents [Diog. Laertius] |
| 1838 | Cyrenaic pleasure is a motion, but Epicurean pleasure is a condition [Diog. Laertius] |
| 1769 | Cynics believe that when a man wishes for nothing he is like the gods [Diog. Laertius] |
| 14504 | The Kripke/Putnam approach to natural kind terms seems to give them excessive stability [Koslicki] |
| 13285 | Natural kinds support inductive inferences, from previous samples to the next one [Koslicki] |
| 13287 | Concepts for species are either intrinsic structure, or relations like breeding or ancestry [Koslicki] |
| 13284 | Should vernacular classifications ever be counted as natural kind terms? [Koslicki] |
| 13286 | There are apparently no scientific laws concerning biological species [Koslicki] |