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All the ideas for 'Intensional Logic', 'First Things First' and 'The Problem of Knowledge'

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17 ideas

2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 1. Fallacy
19463 Induction assumes some uniformity in nature, or that in some respects the future is like the past [Ayer]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 8. Intensional Logic
15375 If terms change their designations in different states, they are functions from states to objects [Fitting]
15376 Intensional logic adds a second type of quantification, over intensional objects, or individual concepts [Fitting]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 9. Awareness Logic
15378 Awareness logic adds the restriction of an awareness function to epistemic logic [Fitting]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 10. Justification Logics
15379 Justication logics make explicit the reasons for mathematical truth in proofs [Fitting]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 8. Logic of Mathematics
11026 Classical logic is deliberately extensional, in order to model mathematics [Fitting]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 3. Property (λ-) Abstraction
11028 λ-abstraction disambiguates the scope of modal operators [Fitting]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
15377 Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds [Fitting]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. Cogito Critique
19461 Knowing I exist reveals nothing at all about my nature [Ayer]
19459 To say 'I am not thinking' must be false, but it might have been true, so it isn't self-contradictory [Ayer]
19460 'I know I exist' has no counterevidence, so it may be meaningless [Ayer]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism
19520 Evidentialism is not axiomatic; the evidence itself inclines us towards evidentialism [Conee]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
19521 If pure guesses were reliable, reliabilists would have to endorse them [Conee]
19522 More than actual reliability is needed, since I may mistakenly doubt what is reliable [Conee]
19523 Reliabilism is poor on reflective judgements about hypothetical cases [Conee]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
19464 We only discard a hypothesis after one failure if it appears likely to keep on failing [Ayer]
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
19462 Induction passes from particular facts to other particulars, or to general laws, non-deductively [Ayer]