16 ideas
6396 | A sentence is held true because of a combination of meaning and belief [Davidson] |
15375 | If terms change their designations in different states, they are functions from states to objects [Fitting] |
15376 | Intensional logic adds a second type of quantification, over intensional objects, or individual concepts [Fitting] |
15378 | Awareness logic adds the restriction of an awareness function to epistemic logic [Fitting] |
15379 | Justication logics make explicit the reasons for mathematical truth in proofs [Fitting] |
11026 | Classical logic is deliberately extensional, in order to model mathematics [Fitting] |
11028 | λ-abstraction disambiguates the scope of modal operators [Fitting] |
15377 | Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds [Fitting] |
11145 | Having a belief involves the possibility of being mistaken [Davidson] |
6397 | The concept of belief can only derive from relationship to a speech community [Davidson] |
20147 | Arguments that my finger does not exist are less certain than your seeing my finger [Moore,GE] |
6392 | Thought depends on speech [Davidson] |
6393 | A creature doesn't think unless it interprets another's speech [Davidson] |
11144 | Concepts are only possible in a language community [Davidson] |
6395 | An understood sentence can be used for almost anything; it isn't language if it has only one use [Davidson] |
6394 | The pattern of sentences held true gives sentences their meaning [Davidson] |