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All the ideas for 'Intensional Logic', 'A Subject with No Object' and 'works'

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33 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
21489 Super-ordinate disciplines give laws or principles; subordinate disciplines give concrete cases [Peirce, by Atkin]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
19095 Pragmatic 'truth' is a term to cover the many varied aims of enquiry [Peirce, by Misak]
19097 Peirce did not think a belief was true if it was useful [Peirce, by Misak]
21494 If truth is the end of enquiry, what if it never ends, or ends prematurely? [Atkin on Peirce]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
9921 'True' is only occasionally useful, as in 'everything Fermat believed was true' [Burgess/Rosen]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
9924 Modal logic gives an account of metalogical possibility, not metaphysical possibility [Burgess/Rosen]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 8. Intensional Logic
15375 If terms change their designations in different states, they are functions from states to objects [Fitting]
15376 Intensional logic adds a second type of quantification, over intensional objects, or individual concepts [Fitting]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 9. Awareness Logic
15378 Awareness logic adds the restriction of an awareness function to epistemic logic [Fitting]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 10. Justification Logics
15379 Justication logics make explicit the reasons for mathematical truth in proofs [Fitting]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / d. Naïve logical sets
9933 The paradoxes are only a problem for Frege; Cantor didn't assume every condition determines a set [Burgess/Rosen]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
9928 Mereology implies that acceptance of entities entails acceptance of conglomerates [Burgess/Rosen]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 8. Logic of Mathematics
11026 Classical logic is deliberately extensional, in order to model mathematics [Fitting]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
21493 Pure mathematics deals only with hypotheses, of which the reality does not matter [Peirce]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
19102 Bivalence is a regulative assumption of enquiry - not a law of logic [Peirce, by Misak]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
9926 A relation is either a set of sets of sets, or a set of sets [Burgess/Rosen]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 3. Property (λ-) Abstraction
11028 λ-abstraction disambiguates the scope of modal operators [Fitting]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / a. Set theory paradoxes
9932 The paradoxes no longer seem crucial in critiques of set theory [Burgess/Rosen]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
9923 We should talk about possible existence, rather than actual existence, of numbers [Burgess/Rosen]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / c. Nominalist structuralism
9925 Structuralism and nominalism are normally rivals, but might work together [Burgess/Rosen]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
9934 Number words became nouns around the time of Plato [Burgess/Rosen]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
9918 Abstract/concrete is a distinction of kind, not degree [Burgess/Rosen]
9929 Much of what science says about concrete entities is 'abstraction-laden' [Burgess/Rosen]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / b. Levels of abstraction
9927 Mathematics has ascended to higher and higher levels of abstraction [Burgess/Rosen]
9930 Abstraction is on a scale, of sets, to attributes, to type-formulas, to token-formulas [Burgess/Rosen]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
10352 The real is the idea in which the community ultimately settles down [Peirce]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
13498 Peirce and others began the mapping out of relations [Peirce, by Hart,WD]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent
21491 Peirce's later realism about possibilities and generalities went beyond logical positivism [Peirce, by Atkin]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
16376 The possible can only be general, and the force of actuality is needed to produce a particular [Peirce]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
15377 Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds [Fitting]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
19107 Inquiry is not standing on bedrock facts, but standing in hope on a shifting bog [Peirce]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
9919 The old debate classified representations as abstract, not entities [Burgess/Rosen]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 2. Space
9922 If space is really just a force-field, then it is a physical entity [Burgess/Rosen]