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All the ideas for 'Intensional Logic', 'The Virtues and Human Nature' and 'How to Define Theoretical Terms'

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19 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
15527 Defining terms either enables elimination, or shows that they don't require elimination [Lewis]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 8. Intensional Logic
15375 If terms change their designations in different states, they are functions from states to objects [Fitting]
15376 Intensional logic adds a second type of quantification, over intensional objects, or individual concepts [Fitting]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 9. Awareness Logic
15378 Awareness logic adds the restriction of an awareness function to epistemic logic [Fitting]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 10. Justification Logics
15379 Justication logics make explicit the reasons for mathematical truth in proofs [Fitting]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 8. Logic of Mathematics
11026 Classical logic is deliberately extensional, in order to model mathematics [Fitting]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 3. Property (λ-) Abstraction
11028 λ-abstraction disambiguates the scope of modal operators [Fitting]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
15377 Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds [Fitting]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
15530 A logically determinate name names the same thing in every possible world [Lewis]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 8. Ramsey Sentences
15531 The Ramsey sentence of a theory says that it has at least one realisation [Lewis]
15528 A Ramsey sentence just asserts that a theory can be realised, without saying by what [Lewis]
15526 There is a method for defining new scientific terms just using the terms we already understand [Lewis]
15529 It is better to have one realisation of a theory than many - but it may not always be possible [Lewis]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
23146 Motives produce intentions, which lead to actions [Driver]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
23147 Good intentions are not necessary for virtue [Driver]
23144 Virtue should be defined by consequences, not by states of mind [Driver]
23148 Virtues are character traits or dispositions which produce good consequences for others [Driver]
23150 Control of pregnancy and knowledge of paternity have downgraded chastity [Driver]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
23149 If generosity systematically turned recipients into parasites, it wouldn't be a virtue [Driver]