35 ideas
17311 | Real definitions don't just single out a thing; they must also explain its essence [Koslicki] |
18986 | Truth is just a name for verification-processes [James] |
18983 | In many cases there is no obvious way in which ideas can agree with their object [James] |
18972 | Ideas are true in so far as they co-ordinate our experiences [James] |
18973 | New opinions count as 'true' if they are assimilated to an individual's current beliefs [James] |
18984 | True ideas are those we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify (and false otherwise) [James] |
15375 | If terms change their designations in different states, they are functions from states to objects [Fitting] |
15376 | Intensional logic adds a second type of quantification, over intensional objects, or individual concepts [Fitting] |
15378 | Awareness logic adds the restriction of an awareness function to epistemic logic [Fitting] |
15379 | Justication logics make explicit the reasons for mathematical truth in proofs [Fitting] |
11026 | Classical logic is deliberately extensional, in order to model mathematics [Fitting] |
11028 | λ-abstraction disambiguates the scope of modal operators [Fitting] |
17312 | It is more explanatory if you show how a number is constructed from basic entities and relations [Koslicki] |
17314 | The relata of grounding are propositions or facts, but for dependence it is objects and their features [Koslicki] |
18987 | A 'thing' is simply carved out of reality for human purposes [James] |
18981 | 'Substance' is just a word for groupings and structures in experience [James] |
17313 | Modern views want essences just to individuate things across worlds and times [Koslicki] |
17309 | For Fine, essences are propositions true because of identity, so they are just real definitions [Koslicki] |
17315 | We need a less propositional view of essence, and so must distinguish it clearly from real definitions [Koslicki] |
15377 | Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds [Fitting] |
18974 | Truth is a species of good, being whatever proves itself good in the way of belief [James] |
18989 | Pragmatism accepts any hypothesis which has useful consequences [James] |
18971 | Theories are practical tools for progress, not answers to enigmas [James] |
18985 | True thoughts are just valuable instruments of action [James] |
18982 | Pragmatism says all theories are instrumental - that is, mental modes of adaptation to reality [James] |
17317 | A good explanation captures the real-world dependence among the phenomena [Koslicki] |
18975 | We return to experience with concepts, where they show us differences [James] |
17316 | We can abstract to a dependent entity by blocking out features of its bearer [Koslicki] |
18980 | If there is a 'greatest knower', it doesn't follow that they know absolutely everything [James] |
18978 | It is hard to grasp a cosmic mind which produces such a mixture of goods and evils [James] |
18991 | If the God hypothesis works well, then it is true [James] |
18977 | The wonderful design of a woodpecker looks diabolical to its victims [James] |
18979 | Things with parts always have some structure, so they always appear to be designed [James] |
18976 | Private experience is the main evidence for God [James] |
18990 | Nirvana means safety from sense experience, and hindus and buddhists are just afraid of life [James] |