14 ideas
| 10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
| 15375 | If terms change their designations in different states, they are functions from states to objects [Fitting] |
| 15376 | Intensional logic adds a second type of quantification, over intensional objects, or individual concepts [Fitting] |
| 15378 | Awareness logic adds the restriction of an awareness function to epistemic logic [Fitting] |
| 15379 | Justication logics make explicit the reasons for mathematical truth in proofs [Fitting] |
| 11026 | Classical logic is deliberately extensional, in order to model mathematics [Fitting] |
| 11028 | λ-abstraction disambiguates the scope of modal operators [Fitting] |
| 10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
| 10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
| 15377 | Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds [Fitting] |
| 10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |
| 21375 | Reason can be vicious, and great crimes have to be rational [Schopenhauer] |
| 21379 | Man's three basic ethical incentives are egoism, malice and compassion [Schopenhauer] |
| 21376 | Philosophy treats animals as exploitable things, ignoring the significance of their lives [Schopenhauer] |