16 ideas
| 2626 | A philosopher is outside any community of ideas [Wittgenstein] |
| 15375 | If terms change their designations in different states, they are functions from states to objects [Fitting] |
| 15376 | Intensional logic adds a second type of quantification, over intensional objects, or individual concepts [Fitting] |
| 15378 | Awareness logic adds the restriction of an awareness function to epistemic logic [Fitting] |
| 15379 | Justication logics make explicit the reasons for mathematical truth in proofs [Fitting] |
| 11026 | Classical logic is deliberately extensional, in order to model mathematics [Fitting] |
| 17505 | Using proper names properly doesn't involve necessary and sufficient conditions [Putnam] |
| 11028 | λ-abstraction disambiguates the scope of modal operators [Fitting] |
| 6569 | 'This sentence is false' sends us in a looping search for its proposition [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin] |
| 11908 | Putnam bases essences on 'same kind', but same kinds may not share properties [Mackie,P on Putnam] |
| 15377 | Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds [Fitting] |
| 3790 | Causes of beliefs are irrelevant to their contents [Wittgenstein] |
| 17508 | Science aims at truth, not at 'simplicity' [Putnam] |
| 17506 | I now think reference by the tests of experts is a special case of being causally connected [Putnam] |
| 11904 | Express natural kinds as a posteriori predicate connections, not as singular terms [Putnam, by Mackie,P] |
| 17507 | Natural kind stereotypes are 'strong' (obvious, like tiger) or 'weak' (obscure, like molybdenum) [Putnam] |