20 ideas
23449 | Interpreting a text is representing it as making sense [Morris,M] |
15375 | If terms change their designations in different states, they are functions from states to objects [Fitting] |
15376 | Intensional logic adds a second type of quantification, over intensional objects, or individual concepts [Fitting] |
15378 | Awareness logic adds the restriction of an awareness function to epistemic logic [Fitting] |
15379 | Justication logics make explicit the reasons for mathematical truth in proofs [Fitting] |
8679 | We perceive the objects of set theory, just as we perceive with our senses [Gödel] |
9942 | Gödel proved the classical relative consistency of the axiom V = L [Gödel, by Putnam] |
11026 | Classical logic is deliberately extensional, in order to model mathematics [Fitting] |
23484 | Bipolarity adds to Bivalence the capacity for both truth values [Morris,M] |
11028 | λ-abstraction disambiguates the scope of modal operators [Fitting] |
23494 | Conjunctive and disjunctive quantifiers are too specific, and are confined to the finite [Morris,M] |
18062 | Set-theory paradoxes are no worse than sense deception in physics [Gödel] |
23460 | To count, we must distinguish things, and have a series with successors in it [Morris,M] |
23451 | Counting needs to distinguish things, and also needs the concept of a successor in a series [Morris,M] |
23452 | Discriminating things for counting implies concepts of identity and distinctness [Morris,M] |
10868 | The Continuum Hypothesis is not inconsistent with the axioms of set theory [Gödel, by Clegg] |
13517 | If set theory is consistent, we cannot refute or prove the Continuum Hypothesis [Gödel, by Hart,WD] |
10271 | Basic mathematics is related to abstract elements of our empirical ideas [Gödel] |
15377 | Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds [Fitting] |
23491 | There must exist a general form of propositions, which are predictabe. It is: such and such is the case [Morris,M] |