68 ideas
1695 | Without extensive examination firm statements are hard, but studying the difficulties is profitable [Aristotle] |
23728 | Analysis aims to express the full set of platitudes surrounding a given concept [Smith,M] |
1697 | The contrary of good is bad, but the contrary of bad is either good or another evil [Aristotle] |
1698 | Both sides of contraries need not exist (as health without sickness, white without black) [Aristotle] |
23744 | Defining a set of things by paradigms doesn't pin them down enough [Smith,M] |
11034 | The differentiae of genera which are different are themselves different in kind [Aristotle] |
18367 | A true existence statement has its truth caused by the existence of the thing [Aristotle] |
15375 | If terms change their designations in different states, they are functions from states to objects [Fitting] |
15376 | Intensional logic adds a second type of quantification, over intensional objects, or individual concepts [Fitting] |
15378 | Awareness logic adds the restriction of an awareness function to epistemic logic [Fitting] |
15379 | Justication logics make explicit the reasons for mathematical truth in proofs [Fitting] |
11033 | Predications of predicates are predications of their subjects [Aristotle] |
11026 | Classical logic is deliberately extensional, in order to model mathematics [Fitting] |
11028 | λ-abstraction disambiguates the scope of modal operators [Fitting] |
11044 | One is prior to two, because its existence is implied by two [Aristotle] |
11042 | Parts of a line join at a point, so it is continuous [Aristotle] |
11041 | Some quantities are discrete, like number, and others continuous, like lines, time and space [Aristotle] |
11286 | Primary being must be more than mere indeterminate ultimate subject of predication [Politis on Aristotle] |
1700 | There are six kinds of change: generation, destruction, increase, diminution, alteration, change of place [Aristotle] |
1699 | A thing is prior to another if it implies its existence [Aristotle] |
18366 | Of interdependent things, the prior one causes the other's existence [Aristotle] |
11035 | There are ten basic categories for thinking about things [Aristotle] |
3311 | The categories (substance, quality, quantity, relation, action, passion, place, time) peter out inconsequentially [Benardete,JA on Aristotle] |
13121 | Substance,Quantity,Quality,Relation,Place,Time,Being-in-a-position,Having,Doing,Being affected [Aristotle, by Westerhoff] |
16116 | Aristotle derived categories as answers to basic questions about nature, size, quality, location etc. [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
21345 | Aristotle said relations are not substances, so (if they exist) they must be accidents [Aristotle, by Heil] |
16155 | Aristotle promoted the importance of properties and objects (rather than general and particular) [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
11032 | Some things said 'of' a subject are not 'in' the subject [Aristotle] |
11038 | We call them secondary 'substances' because they reveal the primary substances [Aristotle] |
16739 | Four species of quality: states, capacities, affects, and forms [Aristotle, by Pasnau] |
11037 | Colour must be in an individual body, or it is not embodied [Aristotle] |
16154 | Aristotle gave up his earlier notion of individuals, because it relied on universals [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
12351 | Genus and species are substances, because only they reveal the primary substance [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
11040 | A single substance can receive contrary properties [Aristotle] |
1694 | Substances have no opposites, and don't come in degrees (including if the substance is a man) [Aristotle] |
16091 | Is primary substance just an ultimate subject, or some aspect of a complex body? [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
11280 | Primary being is 'that which lies under', or 'particular substance' [Aristotle, by Politis] |
11036 | A 'primary' substance is in each subject, with species or genera as 'secondary' substances [Aristotle] |
16140 | Secondary substances do have subjects, so they are not ultimate in the ontology [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
10965 | In earlier Aristotle the substances were particulars, not kinds [Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred] |
8287 | Earlier Aristotle had objects as primary substances, but later he switched to substantial form [Aristotle, by Lowe] |
12350 | Things are called 'substances' because they are subjects for everything else [Aristotle] |
11039 | A primary substance reveals a 'this', which is an individual unit [Aristotle] |
12361 | Primary substances are ontological in 'Categories', and explanatory in 'Metaphysics' [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
3315 | Aristotle denigrates the category of relation, but for modern absolutists self-relation is basic [Benardete,JA on Aristotle] |
15377 | Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds [Fitting] |
23743 | Capturing all the common sense facts about rationality is almost impossible [Smith,M] |
12349 | Only what can be said of many things is a predicable [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
11837 | Some predicates signify qualification of a substance, others the substance itself [Aristotle] |
23723 | In the Humean account, desires are not true/false, or subject to any rational criticism [Smith,M] |
23735 | Subjects may be fallible about the desires which explain their actions [Smith,M] |
23736 | A person can have a desire without feeling it [Smith,M] |
23739 | Goals need desires, and so only desires can motivate us [Smith,M] |
23738 | Humeans (unlike their opponents) say that desires and judgements can separate [Smith,M] |
23742 | If first- and second-order desires conflict, harmony does not require the second-order to win [Smith,M] |
23746 | Objective reasons to act might be the systematic desires of a fully rational person [Smith,M] |
23724 | A pure desire could be criticised if it were based on a false belief [Smith,M] |
23733 | Motivating reasons are psychological, while normative reasons are external [Smith,M] |
23740 | Humeans take maximising desire satisfaction as the normative reasons for actions [Smith,M] |
23745 | We cannot expect even fully rational people to converge on having the same desires for action [Smith,M] |
23731 | 'Externalists' say moral judgements are not reasons, and maybe not even motives [Smith,M] |
23732 | A person could make a moral judgement without being in any way motivated by it [Smith,M] |
23729 | Moral internalism says a judgement of rightness is thereby motivating [Smith,M] |
23730 | 'Rationalism' says the rightness of an action is a reason to perform it [Smith,M] |
23727 | Expressivists count attitudes as 'moral' if they concern features of things, rather than their mere existence [Smith,M] |
23741 | Is valuing something a matter of believing or a matter of desiring? [Smith,M] |
11043 | It is not possible for fire to be cold or snow black [Aristotle] |
1696 | Change goes from possession to loss (as in baldness), but not the other way round [Aristotle] |