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All the ideas for 'Intensional Logic', 'Causality: Reductionism versus Realism' and 'Essays on Intellectual Powers 3: Memory'

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25 ideas

4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 8. Intensional Logic
15375 If terms change their designations in different states, they are functions from states to objects [Fitting]
15376 Intensional logic adds a second type of quantification, over intensional objects, or individual concepts [Fitting]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 9. Awareness Logic
15378 Awareness logic adds the restriction of an awareness function to epistemic logic [Fitting]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 10. Justification Logics
15379 Justication logics make explicit the reasons for mathematical truth in proofs [Fitting]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 8. Logic of Mathematics
11026 Classical logic is deliberately extensional, in order to model mathematics [Fitting]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 3. Property (λ-) Abstraction
11028 λ-abstraction disambiguates the scope of modal operators [Fitting]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
1350 Continuity is needed for existence, otherwise we would say a thing existed after it ceased to exist [Reid]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 13. No Identity over Time
21322 We treat slowly changing things as identical for the sake of economy in language [Reid]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
21320 Identity is familiar to common sense, but very hard to define [Reid]
1367 Identity can only be affirmed of things which have a continued existence [Reid]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
15377 Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds [Fitting]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
23644 Without memory we could have no concept of duration [Reid]
23643 We all trust our distinct memories (but not our distinct imaginings) [Reid]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
1356 A person is a unity, and doesn't come in degrees [Reid]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 2. Persons as Responsible
1359 Personal identity is the basis of all rights, obligations and responsibility [Reid]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 3. Persons as Reasoners
21319 I can hardly care about rational consequence if it wasn't me conceiving the antecedent [Reid]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
21323 The identity of a thief is only known by similarity, but memory gives certainty in our own case [Reid]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / c. Inadequacy of mental continuity
21321 Memory reveals my past identity - but so does testimony of other witnesses [Reid]
21324 If consciousness is transferable 20 persons can be 1; forgetting implies 1 can be 20 [Reid]
21325 Boy same as young man, young man same as old man, old man not boy, if forgotten! [Reid]
21327 If a stolen horse is identified by similitude, its identity is not therefore merely similitude [Reid]
1366 If consciousness is personal identity, it is continually changing [Reid]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 7. Self and Thinking
1352 Thoughts change continually, but the self doesn't [Reid]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
8416 Reductionists can't explain accidents, uninstantiated laws, probabilities, or the existence of any laws [Tooley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / e. Probabilistic causation
8418 Quantum physics suggests that the basic laws of nature are probabilistic [Tooley]