22 ideas
12223 | It is a fallacy to explain the obscure with the even more obscure [Hale/Wright] |
15375 | If terms change their designations in different states, they are functions from states to objects [Fitting] |
15376 | Intensional logic adds a second type of quantification, over intensional objects, or individual concepts [Fitting] |
15378 | Awareness logic adds the restriction of an awareness function to epistemic logic [Fitting] |
15379 | Justication logics make explicit the reasons for mathematical truth in proofs [Fitting] |
11026 | Classical logic is deliberately extensional, in order to model mathematics [Fitting] |
12394 | If the result is bad, we change the rule; if we like the rule, we reject the result [Goodman] |
12230 | Singular terms refer if they make certain atomic statements true [Hale/Wright] |
11028 | λ-abstraction disambiguates the scope of modal operators [Fitting] |
12225 | Neo-Fregeanism might be better with truth-makers, rather than quantifier commitment [Hale/Wright] |
12224 | Are neo-Fregeans 'maximalists' - that everything which can exist does exist? [Hale/Wright] |
12226 | The identity of Pegasus with Pegasus may be true, despite the non-existence [Hale/Wright] |
12229 | Maybe we have abundant properties for semantics, and sparse properties for ontology [Hale/Wright] |
18443 | A successful predicate guarantees the existence of a property - the way of being it expresses [Hale/Wright] |
14292 | Dispositions seem more ethereal than behaviour; a non-occult account of them would be nice [Goodman] |
15377 | Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds [Fitting] |
18749 | Goodman argued that the confirmation relation can never be formalised [Goodman, by Horsten/Pettigrew] |
17646 | Goodman showed that every sound inductive argument has an unsound one of the same form [Goodman, by Putnam] |
12227 | Abstractionism needs existential commitment and uniform truth-conditions [Hale/Wright] |
12228 | Equivalence abstraction refers to objects otherwise beyond our grasp [Hale/Wright] |
12231 | Reference needs truth as well as sense [Hale/Wright] |
4794 | We don't use laws to make predictions, we call things laws if we make predictions with them [Goodman] |