16 ideas
15375 | If terms change their designations in different states, they are functions from states to objects [Fitting] |
15376 | Intensional logic adds a second type of quantification, over intensional objects, or individual concepts [Fitting] |
15378 | Awareness logic adds the restriction of an awareness function to epistemic logic [Fitting] |
15379 | Justication logics make explicit the reasons for mathematical truth in proofs [Fitting] |
11026 | Classical logic is deliberately extensional, in order to model mathematics [Fitting] |
12394 | If the result is bad, we change the rule; if we like the rule, we reject the result [Goodman] |
11028 | λ-abstraction disambiguates the scope of modal operators [Fitting] |
18430 | We accept properties because of type/tokens, reference, and quantification [Edwards] |
18432 | Quineans say that predication is primitive and inexplicable [Edwards] |
14292 | Dispositions seem more ethereal than behaviour; a non-occult account of them would be nice [Goodman] |
18437 | Resemblance nominalism requires a second entity to explain 'the rose is crimson' [Edwards] |
18434 | That a whole is prior to its parts ('priority monism') is a view gaining in support [Edwards] |
15377 | Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds [Fitting] |
18749 | Goodman argued that the confirmation relation can never be formalised [Goodman, by Horsten/Pettigrew] |
17646 | Goodman showed that every sound inductive argument has an unsound one of the same form [Goodman, by Putnam] |
4794 | We don't use laws to make predictions, we call things laws if we make predictions with them [Goodman] |