14 ideas
| 15375 | If terms change their designations in different states, they are functions from states to objects [Fitting] |
| 15376 | Intensional logic adds a second type of quantification, over intensional objects, or individual concepts [Fitting] |
| 15378 | Awareness logic adds the restriction of an awareness function to epistemic logic [Fitting] |
| 15379 | Justication logics make explicit the reasons for mathematical truth in proofs [Fitting] |
| 11026 | Classical logic is deliberately extensional, in order to model mathematics [Fitting] |
| 12394 | If the result is bad, we change the rule; if we like the rule, we reject the result [Goodman] |
| 11028 | λ-abstraction disambiguates the scope of modal operators [Fitting] |
| 14292 | Dispositions seem more ethereal than behaviour; a non-occult account of them would be nice [Goodman] |
| 15377 | Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds [Fitting] |
| 18699 | Carnap tried to define all scientific predicates in terms of primitive relations, using type theory [Carnap, by Button] |
| 18749 | Goodman argued that the confirmation relation can never be formalised [Goodman, by Horsten/Pettigrew] |
| 17646 | Goodman showed that every sound inductive argument has an unsound one of the same form [Goodman, by Putnam] |
| 12131 | All concepts can be derived from a few basics, making possible one science of everything [Carnap, by Brody] |
| 4794 | We don't use laws to make predictions, we call things laws if we make predictions with them [Goodman] |