13 ideas
18009 | Chomsky established the view that category mistakes are well-formed but meaningless [Chomsky, by Magidor] |
15375 | If terms change their designations in different states, they are functions from states to objects [Fitting] |
15376 | Intensional logic adds a second type of quantification, over intensional objects, or individual concepts [Fitting] |
15378 | Awareness logic adds the restriction of an awareness function to epistemic logic [Fitting] |
15379 | Justication logics make explicit the reasons for mathematical truth in proofs [Fitting] |
11026 | Classical logic is deliberately extensional, in order to model mathematics [Fitting] |
11028 | λ-abstraction disambiguates the scope of modal operators [Fitting] |
12177 | Human artefacts may have essences, in their purposes [Popper] |
15377 | Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds [Fitting] |
12176 | Science does not aim at ultimate explanations [Popper] |
18007 | Syntax is independent of semantics; sentences can be well formed but meaningless [Chomsky, by Magidor] |
12175 | Galilean science aimed at true essences, as the ultimate explanations [Popper] |
12179 | Essentialist views of science prevent further questions from being raised [Popper] |