24 ideas
17641 | Discoveries in mathematics can challenge philosophy, and offer it a new foundation [Russell] |
17638 | If one proposition is deduced from another, they are more certain together than alone [Russell] |
17632 | Non-contradiction was learned from instances, and then found to be indubitable [Russell] |
15375 | If terms change their designations in different states, they are functions from states to objects [Fitting] |
15376 | Intensional logic adds a second type of quantification, over intensional objects, or individual concepts [Fitting] |
15378 | Awareness logic adds the restriction of an awareness function to epistemic logic [Fitting] |
15379 | Justication logics make explicit the reasons for mathematical truth in proofs [Fitting] |
11026 | Classical logic is deliberately extensional, in order to model mathematics [Fitting] |
11028 | λ-abstraction disambiguates the scope of modal operators [Fitting] |
17629 | Which premises are ultimate varies with context [Russell] |
17630 | The sources of a proof are the reasons why we believe its conclusion [Russell] |
17640 | Finding the axioms may be the only route to some new results [Russell] |
17627 | It seems absurd to prove 2+2=4, where the conclusion is more certain than premises [Russell] |
17628 | Arithmetic was probably inferred from relationships between physical objects [Russell] |
14347 | A 'finkish' disposition is one that is lost immediately after the appropriate stimulus [Corry] |
14348 | An 'antidote' allows a manifestation to begin, but then blocks it [Corry] |
14350 | If a disposition is never instantiated, it shouldn't be part of our theory of nature [Corry] |
15377 | Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds [Fitting] |
17637 | The most obvious beliefs are not infallible, as other obvious beliefs may conflict [Russell] |
17639 | Believing a whole science is more than believing each of its propositions [Russell] |
14351 | Maybe an experiment unmasks an essential disposition, and reveals its regularities [Corry] |
17631 | Induction is inferring premises from consequences [Russell] |
17633 | The law of gravity has many consequences beyond its grounding observations [Russell] |
14346 | Dispositional essentialism says fundamental laws of nature are strict, not ceteris paribus [Corry] |