Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Intensional Logic', 'Naming and Necessity notes and addenda' and 'Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Tractatus'

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28 ideas

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 3. Hermeneutics
23449 Interpreting a text is representing it as making sense [Morris,M]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 8. Intensional Logic
15375 If terms change their designations in different states, they are functions from states to objects [Fitting]
15376 Intensional logic adds a second type of quantification, over intensional objects, or individual concepts [Fitting]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 9. Awareness Logic
15378 Awareness logic adds the restriction of an awareness function to epistemic logic [Fitting]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 10. Justification Logics
15379 Justication logics make explicit the reasons for mathematical truth in proofs [Fitting]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 8. Logic of Mathematics
11026 Classical logic is deliberately extensional, in order to model mathematics [Fitting]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
23484 Bipolarity adds to Bivalence the capacity for both truth values [Morris,M]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 3. Property (λ-) Abstraction
11028 λ-abstraction disambiguates the scope of modal operators [Fitting]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
23494 Conjunctive and disjunctive quantifiers are too specific, and are confined to the finite [Morris,M]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
23451 Counting needs to distinguish things, and also needs the concept of a successor in a series [Morris,M]
23460 To count, we must distinguish things, and have a series with successors in it [Morris,M]
23452 Discriminating things for counting implies concepts of identity and distinctness [Morris,M]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
17000 We might fix identities for small particulars, but it is utopian to hope for such things [Kripke]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
11868 A different piece of wood could have been used for that table; constitution isn't identity [Wiggins on Kripke]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
17044 A relation can clearly be reflexive, and identity is the smallest reflexive relation [Kripke]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 9. Sameness
16999 A vague identity may seem intransitive, and we might want to talk of 'counterparts' [Kripke]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
17058 What many people consider merely physically necessary I consider completely necessary [Kripke]
4970 What is often held to be mere physical necessity is actually metaphysical necessity [Kripke]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
17059 Unicorns are vague, so no actual or possible creature could count as a unicorn [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
4950 Possible worlds are useful in set theory, but can be very misleading elsewhere [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
15377 Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds [Fitting]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
17003 Kaplan's 'Dthat' is a useful operator for transforming a description into a rigid designation [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
9221 The best known objection to counterparts is Kripke's, that Humphrey doesn't care if his counterpart wins [Kripke, by Sider]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
17052 The a priori analytic truths involving fixing of reference are contingent [Kripke]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
4969 I regard the mind-body problem as wide open, and extremely confusing [Kripke]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / c. Social reference
4956 A description may fix a reference even when it is not true of its object [Kripke]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
17032 Even if Gödel didn't produce his theorems, he's still called 'Gödel' [Kripke]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
23491 There must exist a general form of propositions, which are predictabe. It is: such and such is the case [Morris,M]