Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Intensional Logic', 'An Introduction to Hegel' and 'Conditionals (Stanf)'

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22 ideas

4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / c. Derivation rules of PL
Conditional Proof is only valid if we accept the truth-functional reading of 'if' [Edgington]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 8. Intensional Logic
If terms change their designations in different states, they are functions from states to objects [Fitting]
Intensional logic adds a second type of quantification, over intensional objects, or individual concepts [Fitting]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 9. Awareness Logic
Awareness logic adds the restriction of an awareness function to epistemic logic [Fitting]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 10. Justification Logics
Justication logics make explicit the reasons for mathematical truth in proofs [Fitting]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 8. Logic of Mathematics
Classical logic is deliberately extensional, in order to model mathematics [Fitting]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 3. Property (λ-) Abstraction
λ-abstraction disambiguates the scope of modal operators [Fitting]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
A thing works like formal probability if all the options sum to 100% [Edgington]
Conclusion improbability can't exceed summed premise improbability in valid arguments [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / b. Types of conditional
Simple indicatives about past, present or future do seem to form a single semantic kind [Edgington]
Maybe forward-looking indicatives are best classed with the subjunctives [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
Truth-function problems don't show up in mathematics [Edgington]
Inferring conditionals from disjunctions or negated conjunctions gives support to truth-functionalism [Edgington]
The truth-functional view makes conditionals with unlikely antecedents likely to be true [Edgington]
Doctor:'If patient still alive, change dressing'; Nurse:'Either dead patient, or change dressing'; kills patient! [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
Non-truth-functionalist say 'If A,B' is false if A is T and B is F, but deny that is always true for TT,FT and FF [Edgington]
I say "If you touch that wire you'll get a shock"; you don't touch it. How can that make the conditional true? [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / e. Supposition conditionals
On the supposition view, believe if A,B to the extent that A&B is nearly as likely as A [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / f. Pragmatics of conditionals
Truth-functionalists support some conditionals which we assert, but should not actually believe [Edgington]
Does 'If A,B' say something different in each context, because of the possibiites there? [Edgington]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds [Fitting]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
The moral will is self-determining, but the ethical will is met in society [Houlgate]