18 ideas
15663 | Adorno and Horkheimer subjected the Enlightenment to 'critical theory' analysis [Adorno/Horkheimer, by Finlayson] |
10928 | Maybe we can quantify modally if the objects are intensional, but it seems unlikely [Quine] |
15375 | If terms change their designations in different states, they are functions from states to objects [Fitting] |
15376 | Intensional logic adds a second type of quantification, over intensional objects, or individual concepts [Fitting] |
15378 | Awareness logic adds the restriction of an awareness function to epistemic logic [Fitting] |
15379 | Justication logics make explicit the reasons for mathematical truth in proofs [Fitting] |
11026 | Classical logic is deliberately extensional, in order to model mathematics [Fitting] |
10925 | Failure of substitutivity shows that a personal name is not purely referential [Quine] |
11028 | λ-abstraction disambiguates the scope of modal operators [Fitting] |
10926 | Quantifying into referentially opaque contexts often produces nonsense [Quine] |
10930 | Quantification into modal contexts requires objects to have an essence [Quine] |
14645 | To be necessarily greater than 7 is not a trait of 7, but depends on how 7 is referred to [Quine] |
9201 | Whether 9 is necessarily greater than 7 depends on how '9' is described [Quine, by Fine,K] |
10927 | Necessity only applies to objects if they are distinctively specified [Quine] |
9203 | We can't quantify in modal contexts, because the modality depends on descriptions, not objects [Quine, by Fine,K] |
15377 | Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds [Fitting] |
20572 | De Sade said it was impossible to rationally argue against murder [Adorno/Horkheimer] |
10931 | We can't say 'necessarily if x is in water then x dissolves' if we can't quantify modally [Quine] |