36 ideas
17729 | Examining concepts can recover information obtained through the senses [Jenkins] |
15134 | The truthmaker principle requires some specific named thing to make the difference [Williamson] |
15141 | Truthmaker is incompatible with modal semantics of varying domains [Williamson] |
15140 | The converse Barcan formula will not allow contingent truths to have truthmakers [Williamson] |
17740 | Instead of correspondence of proposition to fact, look at correspondence of its parts [Jenkins] |
15131 | If metaphysical possibility is not a contingent matter, then S5 seems to suit it best [Williamson] |
15135 | If the domain of propositional quantification is constant, the Barcan formulas hold [Williamson] |
15139 | Converse Barcan: could something fail to meet a condition, if everything meets that condition? [Williamson] |
15375 | If terms change their designations in different states, they are functions from states to objects [Fitting] |
15376 | Intensional logic adds a second type of quantification, over intensional objects, or individual concepts [Fitting] |
15378 | Awareness logic adds the restriction of an awareness function to epistemic logic [Fitting] |
15379 | Justication logics make explicit the reasons for mathematical truth in proofs [Fitting] |
11026 | Classical logic is deliberately extensional, in order to model mathematics [Fitting] |
11028 | λ-abstraction disambiguates the scope of modal operators [Fitting] |
18492 | Not all quantification is either objectual or substitutional [Williamson] |
15136 | Substitutional quantification is metaphysical neutral, and equivalent to a disjunction of instances [Williamson] |
15138 | Not all quantification is objectual or substitutional [Williamson] |
17730 | Combining the concepts of negation and finiteness gives the concept of infinity [Jenkins] |
17719 | Arithmetic concepts are indispensable because they accurately map the world [Jenkins] |
17717 | Senses produce concepts that map the world, and arithmetic is known through these concepts [Jenkins] |
17724 | It is not easy to show that Hume's Principle is analytic or definitive in the required sense [Jenkins] |
17727 | We can learn about the world by studying the grounding of our concepts [Jenkins] |
17720 | There's essential, modal, explanatory, conceptual, metaphysical and constitutive dependence [Jenkins, by PG] |
15137 | If 'fact' is a noun, can we name the fact that dogs bark 'Mary'? [Williamson] |
17728 | The concepts we have to use for categorising are ones which map the real world well [Jenkins] |
15377 | Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds [Fitting] |
15142 | Our ability to count objects across possibilities favours the Barcan formulas [Williamson] |
17726 | Examining accurate, justified or grounded concepts brings understanding of the world [Jenkins] |
17734 | It is not enough that intuition be reliable - we need to know why it is reliable [Jenkins] |
17723 | Knowledge is true belief which can be explained just by citing the proposition believed [Jenkins] |
17739 | The physical effect of world on brain explains the concepts we possess [Jenkins] |
17718 | Grounded concepts are trustworthy maps of the world [Jenkins] |
17731 | Verificationism is better if it says meaningfulness needs concepts grounded in the senses [Jenkins] |
17732 | Success semantics explains representation in terms of success in action [Jenkins] |
17725 | 'Analytic' can be conceptual, or by meaning, or predicate inclusion, or definition... [Jenkins] |
15133 | A thing can't be the only necessary existent, because its singleton set would be as well [Williamson] |