22 ideas
17311 | Real definitions don't just single out a thing; they must also explain its essence [Koslicki] |
15375 | If terms change their designations in different states, they are functions from states to objects [Fitting] |
15376 | Intensional logic adds a second type of quantification, over intensional objects, or individual concepts [Fitting] |
15378 | Awareness logic adds the restriction of an awareness function to epistemic logic [Fitting] |
15379 | Justication logics make explicit the reasons for mathematical truth in proofs [Fitting] |
11026 | Classical logic is deliberately extensional, in order to model mathematics [Fitting] |
11028 | λ-abstraction disambiguates the scope of modal operators [Fitting] |
21642 | If quantification is all substitutional, there is no ontology [Quine] |
17312 | It is more explanatory if you show how a number is constructed from basic entities and relations [Koslicki] |
1633 | Absolute ontological questions are meaningless, because the answers are circular definitions [Quine] |
17314 | The relata of grounding are propositions or facts, but for dependence it is objects and their features [Koslicki] |
18964 | Ontology is relative to both a background theory and a translation manual [Quine] |
17313 | Modern views want essences just to individuate things across worlds and times [Koslicki] |
17309 | For Fine, essences are propositions true because of identity, so they are just real definitions [Koslicki] |
17315 | We need a less propositional view of essence, and so must distinguish it clearly from real definitions [Koslicki] |
18965 | We know what things are by distinguishing them, so identity is part of ontology [Quine] |
15377 | Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds [Fitting] |
1634 | Two things are relative - the background theory, and translating the object theory into the background theory [Quine] |
17317 | A good explanation captures the real-world dependence among the phenomena [Koslicki] |
17316 | We can abstract to a dependent entity by blocking out features of its bearer [Koslicki] |
8470 | Reference is inscrutable, because we cannot choose between theories of numbers [Quine, by Orenstein] |
18963 | Indeterminacy translating 'rabbit' depends on translating individuation terms [Quine] |