15 ideas
10153 | In everyday language, truth seems indefinable, inconsistent, and illogical [Tarski] |
3745 | Must sentences make statements to qualify for truth? [O'Connor] |
3742 | Beliefs must match facts, but also words must match beliefs [O'Connor] |
3744 | The semantic theory requires sentences as truth-bearers, not propositions [O'Connor] |
3749 | What does 'true in English' mean? [O'Connor] |
19141 | Tarski thought axiomatic truth was too contingent, and in danger of inconsistencies [Tarski, by Davidson] |
10048 | There is no clear boundary between the logical and the non-logical [Tarski] |
3746 | Logic seems to work for unasserted sentences [O'Connor] |
10694 | Logical consequence is when in any model in which the premises are true, the conclusion is true [Tarski, by Beall/Restall] |
10479 | Logical consequence: true premises give true conclusions under all interpretations [Tarski, by Hodges,W] |
10157 | Tarski improved Hilbert's geometry axioms, and without set-theory [Tarski, by Feferman/Feferman] |
527 | Everything exists which anyone perceives [Metrodorus of Chios] |
3747 | Events are fast changes which are of interest to us [O'Connor] |
3743 | We can't contemplate our beliefs until we have expressed them [O'Connor] |
3748 | Without language our beliefs are particular and present [O'Connor] |