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All the ideas for 'Natural Science (lost)', 'Meditations' and 'Foundations without Foundationalism'

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166 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 5. Later European Thought
Modern science comes from Descartes' view that knowledge doesn't need moral purity [Descartes, by Foucault]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
Descartes impoverished the classical idea of logos, and it no longer covered human experience [Roochnik on Descartes]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Reason says don't assent to uncertain principles, just as much as totally false ones [Descartes]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
Since Plato all philosophers have followed the herd, except Descartes, stuck in superficial reason [Nietzsche on Descartes]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 4. Circularity
It is circular to make truth depend on believing God's existence is true [Arnauld on Descartes]
Descartes is right that in the Christian view only God can guarantee the reliability of senses [Nietzsche on Descartes]
Once it is clear that there is a God who is no deceiver, I conclude that clear and distinct perceptions must be true [Descartes]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 8. Subjective Truth
My general rule is that everything that I perceive clearly and distinctly is true [Descartes]
Someone may think a thing is 'clear and distinct', but be wrong [Leibniz on Descartes]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
Satisfaction is 'truth in a model', which is a model of 'truth' [Shapiro]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 1. Aristotelian Logic
Aristotelian logic is complete [Shapiro]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / a. Types of set
A set is 'transitive' if contains every member of each of its members [Shapiro]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
Choice is essential for proving downward Löwenheim-Skolem [Shapiro]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / a. Sets as existing
Are sets part of logic, or part of mathematics? [Shapiro]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
It is central to the iterative conception that membership is well-founded, with no infinite descending chains [Shapiro]
Russell's paradox shows that there are classes which are not iterative sets [Shapiro]
Iterative sets are not Boolean; the complement of an iterative set is not an iterative sets [Shapiro]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 6. Ordering in Sets
'Well-ordering' of a set is an irreflexive, transitive, and binary relation with a least element [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
There is no 'correct' logic for natural languages [Shapiro]
Logic is the ideal for learning new propositions on the basis of others [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic
Bernays (1918) formulated and proved the completeness of propositional logic [Shapiro]
Can one develop set theory first, then derive numbers, or are numbers more basic? [Shapiro]
Skolem and Gödel championed first-order, and Zermelo, Hilbert, and Bernays championed higher-order [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
First-order logic was an afterthought in the development of modern logic [Shapiro]
The 'triumph' of first-order logic may be related to logicism and the Hilbert programme, which failed [Shapiro]
Maybe compactness, semantic effectiveness, and the Löwenheim-Skolem properties are desirable [Shapiro]
The notion of finitude is actually built into first-order languages [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
Second-order logic is better than set theory, since it only adds relations and operations, and nothing else [Shapiro, by Lavine]
Broad standard semantics, or Henkin semantics with a subclass, or many-sorted first-order semantics? [Shapiro]
Henkin semantics has separate variables ranging over the relations and over the functions [Shapiro]
In standard semantics for second-order logic, a single domain fixes the ranges for the variables [Shapiro]
Completeness, Compactness and Löwenheim-Skolem fail in second-order standard semantics [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 4. Semantic Consequence |=
Semantic consequence is ineffective in second-order logic [Shapiro]
If a logic is incomplete, its semantic consequence relation is not effective [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
Arithmetic and geometry achieve some certainty without worrying about existence [Descartes]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Finding the logical form of a sentence is difficult, and there are no criteria of correctness [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
We might reduce ontology by using truth of sentences and terms, instead of using objects satisfying models [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 4. Satisfaction
'Satisfaction' is a function from models, assignments, and formulas to {true,false} [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
Semantics for models uses set-theory [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 2. Isomorphisms
An axiomatization is 'categorical' if its models are isomorphic, so there is really only one interpretation [Shapiro]
Categoricity can't be reached in a first-order language [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
Downward Löwenheim-Skolem: each satisfiable countable set always has countable models [Shapiro]
Upward Löwenheim-Skolem: each infinite model has infinite models of all sizes [Shapiro]
The Löwenheim-Skolem theorems show an explosion of infinite models, so 1st-order is useless for infinity [Shapiro]
Substitutional semantics only has countably many terms, so Upward Löwenheim-Skolem trivially fails [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 3. Soundness
'Weakly sound' if every theorem is a logical truth; 'sound' if every deduction is a semantic consequence [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 4. Completeness
We can live well without completeness in logic [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 6. Compactness
Non-compactness is a strength of second-order logic, enabling characterisation of infinite structures [Shapiro]
Compactness is derived from soundness and completeness [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 9. Expressibility
A language is 'semantically effective' if its logical truths are recursively enumerable [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
Surely maths is true even if I am dreaming? [Descartes]
I can learn the concepts of duration and number just from observing my own thoughts [Descartes]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
Complex numbers can be defined as reals, which are defined as rationals, then integers, then naturals [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / d. Natural numbers
Only higher-order languages can specify that 0,1,2,... are all the natural numbers that there are [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
Natural numbers are the finite ordinals, and integers are equivalence classes of pairs of finite ordinals [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / g. Continuum Hypothesis
The 'continuum' is the cardinality of the powerset of a denumerably infinite set [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
First-order arithmetic can't even represent basic number theory [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
Some sets of natural numbers are definable in set-theory but not in arithmetic [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
Logicism is distinctive in seeking a universal language, and denying that logic is a series of abstractions [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Mathematics and logic have no border, and logic must involve mathematics and its ontology [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / d. Predicativism
Some reject formal properties if they are not defined, or defined impredicatively [Shapiro]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Everything exists which anyone perceives [Metrodorus of Chios]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
Properties are often seen as intensional; equiangular and equilateral are different, despite identity of objects [Shapiro]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
If I can separate two things in my understanding, then God can separate them in reality [Descartes]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
Substance cannot be conceived or explained to others [Gassendi on Descartes]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
If we remove surface qualities from wax, we have an extended, flexible, changeable thing [Descartes]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
Descartes gives an essence by an encapsulating formula [Descartes, by Almog]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
We know by thought that what is done cannot be undone [Descartes]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
Pythagoras' Theorem doesn't cease to be part of the essence of triangles just because we doubt it [Arnauld on Descartes]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
Belief is not an intellectual state or act, because propositions are affirmed or denied by the will [Descartes, by Zagzebski]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
Descartes tried to model reason on maths instead of 'logos' [Roochnik on Descartes]
Labelling slightly doubtful things as false is irrational [Roochnik on Descartes]
Maybe there is only one certain fact, which is that nothing is certain [Descartes]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
Descartes transformed 'God is thinkable, so he exists' into 'I think, so I exist' [Descartes, by Feuerbach]
In the Meditations version of the Cogito he says "I am; I exist", which avoids presenting it as an argument [Descartes, by Baggini /Fosl]
Modern philosophy set the self-conscious ego in place of God [Descartes, by Feuerbach]
"I think therefore I am" is the absolute truth of consciousness [Sartre on Descartes]
I must even exist if I am being deceived by something [Descartes]
"I am, I exist" is necessarily true every time I utter it or conceive it in my mind [Descartes]
The Cogito is a transcendental argument, not a piece of a priori knowledge [Rey on Descartes]
If I don't think, there is no reason to think that I exist [Descartes]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. Cogito Critique
The Cogito proves subjective experience is basic, but makes false claims about the Self [Russell on Descartes]
Maybe 'I' am not the thinker, but something produced by thought [Nietzsche on Descartes]
The Cogito only works if you already understand what thought and existence are [Mersenne on Descartes]
It is a precondition of the use of the word 'I' that I exist [Ayer on Descartes]
The thing which experiences may be momentary, and change with the next experience [Russell on Descartes]
'I think' assumes I exist, that thinking is known and caused, and that I am doing it [Nietzsche on Descartes]
A thought doesn't imply other thoughts, or enough thoughts to make up a self [Ayer on Descartes]
That I perform an activity (thinking) doesn't prove what type of thing I am [Hobbes on Descartes]
Autistic children seem to use the 'I' concept without seeing themselves as thinkers [Segal on Descartes]
The Cogito assumes a priori the existence of substance, when actually it is a grammatical custom [Nietzsche on Descartes]
How can we infer that all thinking involves self-consciousness, just from my own case? [Kant on Descartes]
My self is not an inference from 'I think', but a presupposition of it [Kant on Descartes]
We cannot give any information a priori about the nature of the 'thing that thinks' [Kant on Descartes]
The fact that I am a subject is not enough evidence to show that I am a substantial object [Kant on Descartes]
Descartes' claim to know his existence before his essence is misleading or absurd [Descartes, by Lowe]
Modern self-consciousness is a doubtful abstraction; only senses and feelings are certain [Feuerbach on Descartes]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
My perceiving of things may be false, but my seeming to perceive them cannot be false [Descartes]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 4. Solipsism
I myself could be the author of all these self-delusions [Descartes]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
A triangle has a separate non-invented nature, shown by my ability to prove facts about it [Descartes]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
For Descartes, objects have one primary quality, which is geometrical [Descartes, by Robinson,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
Why does pain make us sad? [Descartes]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Dogs can make the same judgements as us about variable things [Gassendi on Descartes]
We perceive objects by intellect, not by senses or imagination [Descartes]
The wax is not perceived by the senses, but by the mind alone [Descartes]
We don't 'see' men in heavy clothes, we judge them to be men [Descartes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
To achieve good science we must rebuild from the foundations [Descartes]
Only one certainty is needed for progress (like a lever's fulcrum) [Descartes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Even if my body and objects are imaginary, there may be simpler things which are true [Descartes]
Descartes can't begin again, because sceptics doubt cognitive processes as well as beliefs [Pollock/Cruz on Descartes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism
If pain is felt in a lost limb, I cannot be certain that a felt pain exists in my real limbs [Descartes]
We correct sense errors with other senses, not intellect [Mersenne on Descartes]
The senses can only report, so perception errors are in the judgment [Gassendi on Descartes]
It is prudent never to trust your senses if they have deceived you even once [Descartes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 4. Demon Scepticism
God may have created nothing, but made his creation appear to me as it does now [Descartes]
To achieve full scepticism, I imagine a devil who deceives me about the external world and my own body and senses [Descartes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 5. Dream Scepticism
Waking actions are joined by memory to all our other actions, unlike actions of which we dream [Descartes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
I can only sense an object if it is present, and can't fail to sense it when it is [Descartes]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
Can the pineal gland be moved more slowly or quickly by the mind than by animal spirits? [Spinoza on Descartes]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
We discovers others as well as ourselves in the Cogito [Sartre on Descartes]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
Faculties of the mind aren't parts, as one mind uses them [Descartes]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
Descartes put thought at the centre of the mind problem, but we put sensation [Rey on Descartes]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
Descartes mentions many cognitive faculties, but reduces them to will and intellect [Descartes, by Schmid]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
Imagination and sensation are non-essential to mind [Descartes]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 1. Existence of Persons
Some cause must unite the separate temporal sections of a person [Descartes]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 7. Self and Thinking
Since I only observe myself to be thinking, I conclude that that is my essence [Descartes]
I can exist without imagination and sensing, but they can't exist without me [Descartes]
For Descartes a person's essence is the mind because objects are perceived by mind, not senses [Descartes, by Feuerbach]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Our 'will' just consists of the feeling that when we are motivated to do something, there are no external pressures [Descartes]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
My capacity to make choices with my free will extends as far as any faculty ever could [Descartes]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
The mind is a non-extended thing which thinks [Descartes]
Mind is not extended, unlike the body [Descartes]
Descartes is a substance AND property dualist [Descartes, by Kim]
The mind is utterly indivisible [Descartes]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
Interaction between mental and physical seems to violate the principle of conservation of energy [Rowlands on Descartes]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
The 'thinking thing' may be the physical basis of the mind [Hobbes on Descartes]
Knowing different aspects of brain/mind doesn't make them different [Rorty on Descartes]
Descartes gives no clear criterion for individuating mental substances [Cottingham on Descartes]
Does Descartes have a clear conception of how mind unites with body? [Spinoza on Descartes]
Even Descartes may concede that mental supervenes on neuroanatomical [Lycan on Descartes]
Superman's strength is indubitable, Clark Kent's is doubtful, so they are not the same? [Maslin on Descartes]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 2. Propositional Attitudes
In some thoughts I grasp a subject, but also I will or fear or affirm or deny it [Descartes]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
Descartes created the modern view of rationality, as an internal feature instead of an external vision [Descartes, by Taylor,C]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / b. Error
I make errors because my will extends beyond my understanding [Descartes]
18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas
True ideas are images, such as of a man, a chimera, or God [Descartes]
18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
All ideas are adventitious, and come from the senses [Gassendi on Descartes]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
The ideas of God and of my self are innate in me [Descartes]
I can think of innumerable shapes I have never experienced [Descartes]
The idea of a supremely perfect being is within me, like the basic concepts of mathematics [Descartes]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / a. Final purpose
Many causes are quite baffling, so it is absurd to deduce causes from final purposes [Descartes]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
There must be at least as much in the cause as there is in the effect [Descartes]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
Nothing apart from God could have essential existence, and such a being must be unique and eternal [Descartes]
God the creator is an intelligent, infinite, powerful substance [Descartes]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
It is self-evident that deception is a natural defect, so God could not be a deceiver [Descartes]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
Existence and God's essence are inseparable, like a valley and a mountain, or a triangle and its properties [Descartes]
I cannot think of a supremely perfect being without the supreme perfection of existence [Descartes]
The idea of God in my mind is like the mark a craftsman puts on his work [Descartes]
One idea leads to another, but there must be an initial idea that contains the reality of all the others [Descartes]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
We mustn't worship God as an image because we have no idea of him [Hobbes on Descartes]
We can never conceive of an infinite being [Gassendi on Descartes]
Descartes cannot assume that a most perfect being exists without contradictions [Leibniz on Descartes]
Existence is not a perfection; it is what makes perfection possible [Gassendi on Descartes]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / c. Human Error
Error arises because my faculty for judging truth is not infinite [Descartes]
Since God does not wish to deceive me, my judgement won't make errors if I use it properly [Descartes]
God didn't give us good judgement even about our own lives [Gassendi on Descartes]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / d. Natural Evil
If we ask whether God's works are perfect, we must not take a narrow viewpoint, but look at the universe as a whole [Descartes]